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Female Genital Cutting, The Veil, and Democracy: Navigating Cultural Politics in Human
Rights Discourse

Andrew Flachs

Recently I joined the table for an extended family dinner. Talking as we ate, the family
began by addressing safe, neutral topics like cooking, gardening, and the weather. Inevitably, as
the night progressed and the food diminished, the conversation turned to politics. Our discussion
narrowed on national security when my cousin suggested that airport profiling and attacks on
Middle Eastern communities could serve a beneficial purpose for Americans. Although I do not
shy away from contention, I felt taken aback by this statement. Choosing my words carefully, I
asked him why Middle Eastern people in particular deserved to be singled out. Very plainly, he
answered: “There's just a culture of evil over there”.
This sound byte, recycled from American political discourse (Bush 2002, Reagan 1983),
challenged the basic tenet with which modern anthropologists approach their discipline: We are
trained to believe that culture is neither good nor evil. It is more palatable to think of political
and socioeconomic systems that subjugate or disenfranchise their citizens as morally suspect. To
argue that one has “good” culture while others have “evil” actively places culture in a vacuum
and reflects a deeply ingrained ethnocentrism. But why does so much of the media rhetoric seek
to classify it as such? My cousin's offhand comment spoke to a far more serious reality.
America and Europe have a history of condemning enemy nations as evil or barbarous.
Recently, this rhetoric has manifested in Western condemnations of enemies as human rights
abusers. Due in part to this display of cultural politics, many communities in North America and
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Europe believe that their Western culture embraces freedom and human rights while Arab and
Muslim cultures disregard these values. But what gives the West such moral superiority? Can
cultural practices be misunderstood as human rights issues? Conversely, when do Authoritarian
states incorrectly cite cultural difference as a shield to protect themselves from human rights
advocates?

Cultural Politics, Universalism, and Cultural Relativism

Entrenched in clear philosophical camps, both Islamists and Western leaders engage in
cultural politics. I use that phrase here to refer to a politicized discourse in which culture is
stereotyped, exoticized, and appropriated on the global stage. Cultural politics reduces Western
and Eastern bodies of thought to a few, simple talking points that stand in opposition to 'the
enemy'. Certain practices are lauded while others are ignored, based on their geopolitical use.
The veil, for example, became enormously important when the French and Turkish governments
tried to ban it in public spaces. Thus a symbol of modesty transformed into a symbol of
assertion and liberation. At the same time, the veil became a symbol of disenfranchisement and
patriarchy to some within Western feminism, for whom it represented everything that modern,
enlightenment-influenced women must cast aside. Leaders from George Bush (CNN News
2001) to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (CNN News 2008) use culture as both weapon and shield,
attacking the other's corrupt values while ignoring criticism as cultural miscommunication.
Human rights discourse is hotly contested in law, international relations, and
anthropology circles. During the post-colonial nationalist resurgence in the Middle East and
North Africa, communities in the region rejected human rights because of their Western origins

3
(Chase 2006, Dalacoura 1998, Kepel 2002, Mayer 1998).

This framework continues to

undermine the efforts of human rights workers and both Western and Arab activists have a
responsibility for separating human rights discourse and postcolonial interference.

While

traditional human rights schemes may seek to impose values on other societies, the capabilities
approach forwarded by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum provides a solid philosophical base
for cross cultural dialog. Although many models examine human rights violations through
statistics, the capabilities approach considers them within local, enculturated standards. In this
thesis, I argue that this human rights framework is unique in its potential to guide the respectful
navigation of cultural politics and international dialogue around global inequity and injustice.
Any cross cultural analysis of human rights necessitates a firm understanding of
universalism and cultural relativism.

While human rights have existed conceptually for

centuries, the first attempt toward global codification was drafted in 1948.

Still the most

powerful document of its kind, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) continues to
serve as the basis for international human rights laws, conventions, and agreements. The UDHR
should be commended as a positive step forward in international relations history, but it cannot
and should not remain the final say on universal human rights. Drafted primarily by men from
former colonial powers and entrenched in Western Enlightenment philosophy, the UDHR
espouses individual civil and political rights familiar to European and North American
constitutions. While I do not seek to belittle the importance of first-generation rights, which
serve as important checks to the potential power of any governing body, critics (Galtung 1995,
Monshipouri 1998) note that UDHR is conspicuously less clear on social, economic, and cultural
rights. Where are the rights to peace, development, environmental heritage, or cultural tradition?
Article twenty-seven acknowledges the right to participation of the individual, but the UDHR
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does not address communal rights to customs such as circumcision or veiling. Furthermore, the
philosophy supporting universal rights derived from reason and 'natural law' is necessarily
ethnocentric as it depends on European enlightenment theory and the belief in universal truths
(Dembour 2001, Maduagwu 1987, Renteln 1990).
In practice, universalism entails presumptions of power hierarchy. Whose rights are
deemed universal and whose power structures are entitled to determine this? As the Soviet Bloc
noted with its initial abstention during UDHR ratification, the rights under the Universal
Declaration take shape within a capitalist context in which the autonomous, property holding
individual is the default human being. Because they depend on laws judges, and reparations,
they can only exist in societies with infrastructures designed around large-scale judiciaries,
executives, and market-based economies. Universal rights are designed to remedy problems that
only exist in large scale society: prisons, torture, and government imposition. The UDHR
recognizes the rights to food, health care, property, and higher education, but one must still go
forth to earn them. Drawing on the idea that policy reflects distributions of power, some critics
go so far as to claim that human rights and capitalism are inexorably intertwined, that “because
of the social divisions that make rights both possible and necessary, the net effect of the arrival
and enforcement of rights discourse is more likely to be endless strife than perpetual peace”
(Woodiwiss 2005:

137).

Woodiwiss continues, arguing that human rights are based in

systematic inequalities of hierarchical society (social, economic, political, cultural) and thus
require citizens to sacrifice their desire to change the system while they treat symptoms but offer
no cures to these inequalities. An examination of the rights in the UDHR reveals the assumption
that the state will abuse its power to politically disenfranchise its citizens. While it offers a series
of protections against such abuses, the Universal Declaration offers no solutions to the political,
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societal, economic, and cultural forces that reinforce such a power structure. Universalism is
meaningful because of the prevalence of authoritarian abuses to civil and political rights and its
pragmatism allows for clear action regarding human rights abuses.

When approached

appropriately, universalism can be a valuable tool but its philosophical rigidity makes it illadapted to pluralistic global society in its most extreme form.

Inevitably, such extreme

universalism leads to an equally strong and equally misguided extreme cultural relativism.
As synthesized from the ethical relativist philosophies of: Friedrich Engels, who argued
that ethics were a product of economic situations; Max Weber, who argued that any evaluative
statements are reflections of world views; and Melville Hershkovits, who questioned the
reflection of European and American norms in the Universal declaration (Maduagwu 1987),
extreme cultural relativism argues that no observer can pass judgment on a society. This notion,
advanced by Boasian anthropologists to promote tolerance, challenges not only human rights law
but all international laws. If we deny the existence of any universal rights, international law can
only perpetuate the moral imperialism of the law writers. Relativism is absolutely necessary for
any rights discourse because only a relativist perspective has the potential to challenge a
presumed universality of standards that are actually culturally based (Renteln 1990). This deeper
understanding is an invaluable tool for cross-cultural dialog. This is not to say that human rights
standards apply to only one society but rather that relativism gives advocates and anthropologists
an accurate perspective on ideas of universality, truth, and justice. Such humility and openness
to new ideas are crucial for international dialog. In criticizing universal standards, relativists
point to the inapplicability of Western standards and caution against the presumption of rights
workers who impose those standards on the people they wish to help.
Paradoxically the relativist counter-argument to universalism, designed to protect cultural
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heritage from outside interference, performs a great disservice by homogenizing regional
cultures, excessively separating other communities, and downplaying the importance of human
rights in cultural politics. Pragmatically, extreme relativism cannot survive in an increasingly
globalized world. People are interacting transnationally at incredible rates, bringing historically
isolated cultures into direct contact.

This global scope introduces a host of new social,

economic, and political factors into cross-cultural examinations. Relativists who claim that no
Western standards apply to a particular community assume that members of that community
unanimously agree to reject them. Critics (Dembour 2001, Maduagwu 1987, Mayer 1998) argue
that values differ among colleagues and even family members, so I agree with their sentiment
that no single cultural entity exerts homogeneity. Anthropology is, in part, the science of
understanding cultural patterns, and so we must be especially careful that our observations do not
become simple ‘othering’. Cultural trends might seem to define a society but they could never
hope to express the complicated views of a person.
By focusing on differences between cultures to the exclusion of their similarities,
relativist discourse is counterproductive and divisive. Edward Said criticized this constructed
othering because it establishes that "on the one hand there are Westerners, and on the other there
are Arab-Orientals; the former are (in no particular order) rational, peaceful, liberal, logical,
capable of holding real values, without natural suspicion; the latter are none of these things"
(Said 1994). In perpetuating historical differences, extreme relativism unintentionally exoticizes
the people it aims to protect.
I argue that discarding universal human rights in favor of relativism is unacceptable;
genocide, torture, racism, sexism, and inequality exist and anthropologists should not remain
indifferent to them. However, universalism remains unabashedly Western. The historical and
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ongoing subjugation of poor or geopolitically excluded communities in the global South and East
by corporate, geopolitical leaders in the West without regard to cultural heritage undermine
human rights legitimacy. But if neither universalism nor relativism can appropriately address the
human rights issues in the modern world, what can? As many authors (Cowan et al. 2001,
Santos 2002, Caney 2001, Renteln 1990, Dembour 2001) note, the relativism-universalism
debate tends to frame human rights as falling into one catagory at the expensive of the other.
Fortunately, such dichotomies exist only in social theory. A practical approach to human rights
combines elements of both, producing what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2002) called diatopical
hermeneutics.

Alternately called cross-cultural dialog (Renteln 1990), this approach is

advocated by Western and Middle Eastern scholars including Abdullah an-Na'im (2008) and
Emile Saliyeh (2003).

Once the global community accepts the necessity of human rights

discourse despite its Western origins, previously marginalized voices can add their own input
and form pluralistic and respectful international standards.

By tempering universal rights

discourse with the cross-cultural understanding, human rights dialog can be both effective and
applicable.

Islamism and Contested History

In speaking generally about human rights issues in the Middle East, North Africa, and an
Islamic context, I should clarify my intent. As an outsider, I do not wish to pass judgment on
another society but rather to offer my observations and analysis.

Additionally, Islamic

homogeneity is as much a false construction as Western homogeneity; I can only speak to
general trends while appreciating the great diversity of thought and practice within the Middle
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East and North Africa. For every Western critic of Middle Eastern veiling, a Middle Eastern
critic can respond with similar comments regarding Western materialism or demeaning
pornography. Respectful criticism on either side does not negate the other's validity. Indeed the
greatest value of cross-cultural dialog is the potential to learn and grow through this kind of
discussion. The conflict emerges when political figures use culture to attack their enemies. I do
not intend to deny the effect of religious fervor in the region as a motivator for violence or
human rights violations. Rather, I would argue that the political, social, and economic climate
provided its support to a narrow and extremist version of religion that offers salvation through
obedience to the state and violence against the historical oppressors.

By restricting and

discouraging change, such religious philosophy limits the capabilities of individuals and
communities to fulfill their potential.
Our current conception of civilizational conflict between Islamic cultural tradition and
Western values of life, equality, and personal freedom exists because of inflammatory remarks
from prominent, popular voices on both sides. The New York Times noted the growing distrust
among European officials, including Pope Benedict XVI, placing Islam at odds with the
treasured Western right to free speech (Bilefsky and Fisher 2006). Former president Bush
commented about crusades (Myers 2008) and axes of evil, and one need only watch the FOX
news network to see pundits and statesmen criticize region, religion, and culture. On the other
side, Iranian leaders have leveled a number of charges on America, most notably Khomeini's
infamous Great Satan remark. Ranking Taliban and al-Qaeda members continue to incite acts of
violence and leaders like Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri call for militant attacks
(Aljazeera 2008). Meanwhile various radical groups have implemented terrorist acts in New
York City, London, Madrid, Bali, and throughout the Arab world. Regardless of the origin of
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this tension, East and West both perpetuate inflammatory statements and action. There is fault
on both sides. This is the climate in which Americans, Europeans, North Africans, and MiddleEastern people view one another. In such an environment culture assumes an easy target: the
other becomes symbolically vilified through their traditions. But such hierarchical ranking and
cultural assertion only distracts from the real factors driving this perceived 'culture clash'. To
properly implement cross-cultural dialog between human rights workers and the people they
wish to help, we must first understand the political, social, and economic forces that have formed
the current distrust and perceived disregard for human rights.
Undeniably, the most dramatic force shaping the “myth of confrontation” (Halliday 1996)
is Western colonialism. Since the crusades, the Western world has been both fascinated and
frustrated with the Middle East, leading to the phenomenon Edward Said coined orientalism.
Conceptualizing the Middle East as a strange world complete with a culture resistant to Christian
missionaries allowed European colonial powers to dominate while reducing the population to a
bizarre 'other' composed of regional and recycled anti-Semitic stereotypes (Said 1994). Owing
to its geographical proximity, the Ottoman Empire provided an unwelcome and omnipresent
reminder of this other world during Europe's colonial period. Despite European attacks, the
empire maintained its sovereignty until the early twentieth century.
Memory of this resilience and of Christian defeat during the crusades added the
geopolitical fuel to orientalism. By the time of the Ottoman Empire's collapse following the
First World War, European powers had established themselves throughout the Middle East and
North Africa (Halliday 1996). When colonial powers appeared, they attempted to impose their
own social, economic, and political systems.

As they artificially created new national

boundaries, nation-states appeared haphazardly in the midst of clan boundaries and defunct
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Ottoman provinces, complete with newly developed capitalist market economies that exploited
the trade networks (Tibi 1998).

Frustration with foreign domination festered as European

powers, namely France and Britain, consolidated their power. They appropriated trade and
transportation lines for their geopolitical strategy and kept the people in check through a series of
corrupt regional leaders. Then, with the conclusion of the Second World War, the European
colonial period in the Middle East swiftly declined. Leaving behind only the newly created
Israel and a legacy of authoritarian rule and socioeconomic subjugation, Europe relinquished
official control of the region.
As a result of ethnocentric colonial empires, the West had come to represent exploitation,
aggression, and imposition and colonialism provided the necessary catalyst for modern political
Islam, or Islamism. Part national, religious, and philosophical assertion, Islamism evolved from
a rejection of foreign authoritarian rule and exploitation, finally gaining power in the
postcolonial age (Chase 2006, Dalacoura 1998, Kepel 2002, Mayer 1998).

Often, outside

observers confuse Islam with Islamism. Islam is a religion, a set of moral principles, codified
values, and written traditions. Speaking generally, Muslims draw upon a number of sources for
religious guidance, namely the Qu'ran, the holy revelations of Allah to Mohammed, the Hadith,
the oral traditions of the prophet, and Shari'a, the collected body of Islamic jurisprudence. Of
these, only the Qu'ran is divine while the Hadith and Shari'a derive from human interpretation
(An-Na'im 1996, An-Na'im 2008). Islamism gains its legitimacy from a selectively conservative
Qu'ranic reading and an authoritarian and patriarchal interpretation of the Hadith and Shari'a.
During the power struggles following the prophet Mohammed's death, various religious and
political leaders selectively chose certain texts to fit their strategic needs while opposition was
deemed heretical and anti-Islamic (Moussalli 2001, al-'Ashmawy, 1998). To legitimize their
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power, political rulers emphasized verses justifying, among other ideas, disenfranchisement and
female subordinancy while suppressing others. By enforcing their own narrow views at the
exclusion of liberal or moderate scholars, these early men were able to channel Islamic thought
and political process toward absolutist rule. This historical precedent still haunts Islamist policy
by discrediting the legitimacy of reformers as Western agents.
Such interpretations, combined with military conflict during the crusades "would finally
give the upper hand to authoritarianism and traditionalism and reduce the margins of free public
space and weaken the original powers of society" (Moussalli 2001:49). Reacting to political
stress, an elite group presented their conservative interpretation as truth.

Centuries later,

Islamists drew on this construction as historical fact and recycled it as the basis for their own
authoritarian rule. By presenting extremism as the patriotic alternative to Western colonial rule,
Islamists gained popular support. They worked within the existing confines of the nation-states
and capitalism, funding support for their view of religious polity.

They gained additional

popular support from the rampant corruption, repression, and overall economic failure of secular
states like Morocco, Iran, and Egypt (Kepel 2002, Monshipouri 1998, Waltz and Benstead 2006,
Dwyer, 1991).
Radical groups and thinkers throughout the Middle East and North Africa rose to power,
including the Muslim Brotherhood, Wahhabism, Sayyid Qutb, Ruhollah Khomeini, and Sayyid
Abdul Ala Maududi. Qutb, Khomeini, and Maududi are especially important because their
scholarly critiques of Western materialism, morality, and preoccupation with money, their
commentary on key scripture and Islamic history, and their political efforts to organize a
religious and ostensibly moral state laid the philosophical foundation for modern Islamism.
Their philosophy was radical and political, as it needed to be to compete with similarly radical
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and vocal calls for Zionism and Pan-Arabism among nationalists of every variety during the
turbulent 1960s. Because Qutb was so much more concerned with broad philosophical ideas
than tangible battles or physical wars, he probably would have had reservations about the means
and targets used by Al-Qaeda.

Nonetheless, the terrorist group identifies Qutb as a key

theoretician in their work (Berman 2003). Their influence legitimized an extremist religious
interpretation that marginalized other perspectives and formed an important alliance between
clerics, politicians, and militants. I deny the validity of the positive connotations of the term
fundamentalism because it implies that this restrictive interpretation accurately reflects the
fundamental precepts of Islam. Instead, I agree with Sa'id al-Ashamawy (1998) and favor the
term extremist, which more accurately describes Islamist philosophy.
This alliance came to dominate the postcolonial region when radical Islamism, funded by
Saudi oil and legitimized by Khomeini's revolution, spread throughout the Middle East and
North Africa to call for religious states (Kepel 2002, Dorraj 1999). This previously marginal
and radical movement now had the impetus to shape postcolonial resentment to their political
gain. As part of their political and social domination, the British and French discouraged any
dissent including that based in freedom of religion or ideas and that appealed to human rights
sentiment (Saliyeh 2003). In denying these freedoms, the colonial powers created the ideal
environment for extremists and inspired an underground backlash that fused religious and
nationalist fervor. When the region finally gained independence, the movement fragmentalized
as nationalists succumbed to corruption and religious leaders radicalized. Islamism asserted
itself as a new religious national identity that would remain true to regional development and
'traditional' Arab-Islamic values.

Frustrated by the lack of socioeconomic development and

their corrupt and repressive regimes, "social and political discontent was most commonly
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expressed in the cultural sphere, through a rejection of the nationalist ideologies of the ruling
cliques in favor of Islamist ideology" (Kepel 2002:66). Kepel uses culture here to refer to the
resurgence of identity as an Arab Muslim rather than a citizen of an artificial state, not in
reference to specific cultural heritage.

Transcending the boundaries of national assertion

associated with Islamism, culture deals with clothing, sexuality, and world views, not political
goals.
In fact, cultural practices have relatively little to do with Islamism. The movement’s
success is largely a product of Western subjugation: the presumed cultural confrontation can be
much better described as a geopolitical backlash. Kepel notes that the strict interpretation nearly
caused the Islamist movement to collapse by the turn of the century as rival factions fragmented
and fought against each other in the name of the 'true' way. Unfortunately, the aftermath of the
September eleventh attacks, a "desperate symbol of the isolation, fragmentation, and decline of
the Islamist movement" (Kepel 2002:375), gave extremists the political fuel necessary to
revitalize the movement. The era of globalization has introduced foreign economic, social,
political, and cultural elements. By using culture to define themselves in contrast to the global
community, Islamists hope to deny the advancement of globalization. However, this dichotomy
is false: globalization itself brings as much Eastern culture to the West as vice versa. When
Western nations and corporations attempt to control the local economies globalization is
interpreted, often correctly, as neoimperialism, to the point where some Muslims "feel they are
under siege by the West" (Monshipouri 1998:52). This economic subjugation recalls the former
colonial domination and lends support to extremists who offer an internal, Muslim alternative.
Current Islamist thought, rhetoric, and action bears only a passing resemblance to cultural
practices like gender, dress, or world interpretation.

Instead, it deals with the effort to
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consolidate political power and resist former colonial authority. Inter-regional differences have
been cast aside in favor of a united front against the oppressors in Europe and America.
Anything Western was subject to suspicion strictly because of its origin thanks to a fear of
neocolonialism. This includes the Universal Declaration, drafted before the colonial collapse.
This environment inadvertently nurtured reactionary feelings of nationalism and religious pride.
As part of an intellectual resurgence in the absence of a physical revolution, Muslims came to
"reject Western ideas only because the West tried to force the Muslim world to accept them.
Western force, exploitation, the crusades, and the weakness of Muslims, all caused Muslims to
panic and fear accepting Western ideas" (Amin in Khatab and Bouma 2007:63). This is the
framework within which human rights advocates now work.

Navigating Insularity, Arrogance, and Incompatibility

Numerous critics perceive an incompatibility between Islam and human rights. Some
argue that Islam, Islamic law, and Arab culture are incompatible with human rights (Ali 2007,
Pipes 2003). Others argue that human rights have existed within the Shari'a for centuries (Dwyer
1991, Saliyeh, 2003). Still others contend that human rights and Islam address entirely spheres
of influence (Chase 2006, Donnelly 2003). One critique in cultural politics falls in line with
Samuel Huntington and his ‘clash of civilizations’ theory (1996), which posits that Western
democracy and Islam are mutually inexclusive. In rejecting the absolutism of the incompatibility
theory, I also note that the human rights protections of Shari'a and Islamic tradition have been
unsuccessful in nations claiming to govern under religious law. But to argue that this reflects
culture or even popular tradition ignores centuries of patriarchy and political domination.
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Ayaan Hirsi Ali is one particularly vocal critic. Rather than placing current social order
in its historical context, Ali's 2007 memoir Infidel frames it exclusively within Arab and Islamic
culture.

Throughout her compelling and powerful story, Ali documents and criticizes the

fanaticism in North African communities of her upbringing and her feeling of subordination.
But in each instance, from female genital cutting, veiling, Saudi sexual segregation, book
burning, or even physical violence, Ali blames culture as a driving force. She does not address
the economic necessity of genital cutting in North Africa or the political motivation for
disenfranchising the female population. As I shall discuss later, class elites often use such
cultural practices to further economic and political goals. Even as she observes the state system
failing in Somalia, Ali credits Islam and culture with the appeal of religious fanaticism. This
observation assumes that opportunistic clerics and extremists did not seek to fill the political
vacuum left by the colonial powers.
Although I appreciate Ali's struggle and admire her book, her analysis can be simplistic
because it ignores the complex political, economic, and social push toward "traditional culture"
as interpreted and defined by those in control of the postcolonial Middle East and North Africa.
When culture appears to subjugate, this represents a greater effort to subjugate the population by
those wielding political, social, religious, and economic power. Culture, defined by its fluidity,
cannot force itself upon an unwilling community—only political structures have this influence.
This conflation of culture and state dynamics becomes clear as Ali describes her asylum in
Holland. In contrasting her Somali and Dutch lifestyles, she almost exoticizes her European
standard of living in comparison to the Arab world, ultimately concluding, "one of these worlds
is simply better than the other. Not because of its flashy gadgets, but fundamentally, because of
its values" (Ali 2007:348). I believe that Ali is confusing Holland's political and economic
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stability with its cultural heritage. When allowed to liberalize, as Western states have, European
Christian and Arab Muslim values are extremely similar. Dutch culture is as equally valid and
invalid as Somali or Saudi culture and any arguments to the contrary conflate political stability
with cultural merit and resound with ethnocentrism. Ali owes her success in Europe not to
culture but to state stability and support. To argue cultural or religious superiority supports
ethnocentrism and thus compromises the hope for respectful cross-cultural dialog.
Political leaders can cite a tradition of incompatibility between universal human rights
and Islam because they have strategically controlled the law's interpretation and implementation
(Moussalli 2001). In modern times, Ann Mayer notes that "undemocratic regimes perceived the
growing influence of human rights ideas as a threat, which gave them the incentive to concoct
new sets of Islamic rules on human rights, in which Islamic criteria could be deployed to
override and circumscribe human rights and to maintain old hierarchies and forestall an
advancement of freedoms" (Mayer 2006:68-9). By citing the Western origins of human rights,
such regimes can justify their actions as resistance against the West. As tangible representatives
of a historical oppressor, human rights advocates can appear ethnocentric and recall the efforts of
missionaries sent to save the savages. This idea has significant merit if one notes, with Noam
Chomsky (2003), that American foreign policy uses human rights discourse when it is politically
and economically beneficial. Human rights were at the forefront of the justifications for war
with Iraq, and are completely ignored when the American government wishes to promote
economic and geopolitical stability, as is the case with Saudi Arabia. Such double standards
weaken human rights legitimacy while providing a wary population with greater evidence of a
neo-colonial agenda (Chomsky 1998, Chomsky 2003, Gerges 1999, Halliday 1996). These
tactics also discredit the effort of human rights workers by presenting human rights discourse as
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a tool for military action, political interference, and general ethnocentrism.
Yet, following an extreme relativist logic, one could easily conclude that human rights
are only acceptable for Western nations while the Middle East and North Africa should continue
without them, a conclusion both orientalist (Mayer 1998) and inherently insular (al-'Ashmawy
1998). Beginning with politically motivated restrictions and greatly compounded by colonial
interference, the Arab and Islamic world have engaged in cultural, social, economic, and political
exchanges with the West that have fundamentally shaped their development. Despite their
Western origins, the region accepts the concepts of the nation-state and market economy. More
importantly, the Middle East and North Africa are home to a number of internal human rights
organizations devoted to the development of a regional human rights schemes (Dwyer 1991, The
Harvard Law School Human Rights Program and the Center for the Study of Developing
Countries at Cairo University 2000, Skaine 2005). Any claim of incompatibility due to regional
or Islamic exceptionalism recalls a false nostalgia and posits that culture and society have
remained unchanged and uninfluenced: this is simply not true. Even in its early development,
the ideal authoritarian state governed by strict religious rule has never existed (Moussalli, 2001
Mayer 1998).
With this in mind, I agree with writers like Abdullah an-Na'im (2003), Bassam Tibi
(1998) and Jack Donnely (2003) and argue that the Western origin of human rights discourse
does not limit their applicability. By the same token, Shari’a may offer a useful set of laws for
Western society. This dialectic is crucial to cross-cultural dialog. While noting the potential
societal benefits of both Shari'a law and the Universal Declaration, I must reject the notion that
either is an effective means of ensuring human rights in the Middle East and North Africa in
their current forms.

This false dichotomy is analogous to that between universalism and
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relativism: reality lies in the middle. It is not the concept of human rights that moderate
populations in the Middle East and North Africa take issue with but rather the way in which it is
presented (Halliday 1996).

Modernization and general participation in the world community

should not require Muslims to import Western or Christian values or deny their own cultural
heritage (Haq 2001).

To ensure this, both Western and Arab workers are responsible for

separating human rights discourse from colonial influence. In order to create a human rights
framework with the political legitimacy of Shari’a and the rhetorical strength of the Universal
Declaration, Western human rights advocates must work with their Muslim counterparts and
establish cross-cultural dialog.

Using this tool, they can work to reconcile the Universal

Declaration and Islamic and regional jurisprudence, implementing a viable human rights scheme
removed from Western domination. This approach has already led to considerable success in
Africa, where authors adapted Western human rights documents to their specific cultural needs
in Botswana, Malawi, and Mozambique (Lindholt 1997).
Other relativist critiques highlight the cultural differences between the Western concept
of rights and a non-Western idea of duties. Superficially, the difference between rights and
duties may appear to be inconsequential, and both seek to respectfully promote equity. In
seeking to remain respectfully relativistic, human rights advocates should not succumb to
orientalism and assume that Western and Middle Eastern human rights schemes are mutually
exclusive.

We must remember that neither camp is a homogenized bloc incapable of

understanding the other's concept of preserving dignity. Nonetheless, subtle inconsistencies
become enormously important when using cross cultural dialog to advance a culturally respectful
human rights plan. Like other holy texts, including the Ten Commandments and the gospel, the
Qu'ran deals mostly with duties of people to God, not guaranteed rights. The rights espoused by
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the Universal Declaration seek to protect human dignity through a series of protections from an
authority.
Duties, like the obligation to give charity and provide for one's family, imply human
dignity but they do not explicitly necessitate it. Duties also offer no protection from authority
but instead assume that authority will act benevolently. In this context, the "question whether the
notion of duty contains within it the notion of right is complex. A right does imply a duty but it
is critical to the idea of human rights that the right exists independently of and prior to its
correlative duty. The centrality of duty in Islam is not a mere difference in emphasis but a
judgment that rights are less important between duties" (Dalacoura 1998:57). Because this
description is somewhat simplistic and denies the viability of rights generally, other scholars
(Donnely 2003, Mayer 1998) have criticized such discrepancies. However, I feel that critics on
both sides are complicating the issue. The current use of duties to protect human dignity is not
effective because its enforcement falls to a few political activists who rely on radicalized Islam
to maintain power. A survey of the prisons throughout the region will show that duties are not
sufficient to protect the rights of the incarcerated. This discrepancy inspires Western action.
Because this action may be unsolicited or present a challenge the political authority, it may
appear to be a form of Western subjugation and further encourage Islamism (Bhutto 2008).
Rights and duties intersect in their respect for human dignity and intent to protect it. Utilizing
cross cultural dialog, this common ground can serve as a base for Western and non-Western
human rights workers to implement the culturally established system of duties to guarantee
human rights in practical context.
Those who use duties as a justification to deny human rights often do so to obviate any
political challenge to their authority (Mayer 1998). Similarly, many leaders in the developing
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world claim that economic development must precede adequate human rights, an argument often
voiced by those who encourage industrial investment at the expense of their environmental
resources. There is a certain logic to this argument as much of the West industrialized at the
expense of human and environmental rights. But global dynamics have changed drastically since
Western industrialization.

Transnational entities including corporations and politically

influential organizations controlled mostly by Northern nations have shaped the global economy
such that Southern nations feel pressured to choose between economic success and human rights
(Hernendez-Truyol 2002). Sudden economic liberalization most often leads to a sudden increase
in capital for certain classes while perpetuating the exploitation of the rest, especially women
(Monshipouri 1998, Gruenbaum 2001). Civil and political rights need not and should not be
suspended to provide for economic rights. As with the false 'Full Belly Thesis' offered by
African leaders and described by Rhonda Howard (1983), such action is often a ploy to maintain
power and deny political opposition.

Ignoring popular demand for civil and political

participation can also be an effective way to draw on colonial resentment, as the West may
appear to deny economic development in human rights discourse advocating universal values.
The rights that such leaders claim are so ill-suited to their culture and heritage, such as
free press or gender equality, rarely limit the powerful or wealthy. Whether on the national on
personal level, those who claim cultural difference as a justification for violent crimes like rape
or for beating one’s children invoke an orientalist notion of culture and the other. This claim
presumes that the offender’s culture is unchanging, untouched by modernity, globalization, or
liberal trends. Perversely, it defines culture in the same barbaric and backward stereotypes
imposed upon it by colonialist thought.

Responding to Susan Okin’s 1999 essay Is

Multiculturalism Bad for Women, Katha Pollit (1999) references prominent court cases in which
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immigrants from numerous backgrounds successfully eluded domestic abuse charges by
claiming to be “naive products of a rigid, static society” (Pollit 1999:28). She continues, arguing
that immigrants from countries perceived as modern, such as Italy or Russia, would be unable to
defend themselves in this manner.

However, in accepting national borders, legal codes,

capitalism, or immigration bureaucracy, among any number of new and culturally unfamiliar
systems, those who hide behind cultural exceptionalism for violent crimes betray their
adaptability to the globalization. Thus, it seems clear that this claim is less a maintenance of
heritage than an excuse to keep power, whether this manifests in familial patriarchy or political
leadership. Transnational business and economic rights are respected: one wonders if the
political leaders that support gender inequality on Islamic grounds also refuse to pay interest on
national loans. Indeed, the Qu’ranic restrictions on collecting interest, which could extend to
everything from national debts to credit card payments, are far less ambiguous than those used to
justify patriarchy. Such claims have, at best, a tenuous base in historical or religious reality, as
will be discussed further below.

Martha Nussbaum And The Capabilities Approach

In attempting to reconcile preferential rights, cultural difference, and postcolonial
resentment, it becomes clear that anthropologists must have a widely applicable and respectful
philosophical basis from which to initiate cross-cultural dialog. A variety of human rights
schemes may attempt to define a series of rights, as with the UDHR, advise Western solutions, as
with American democratization policies, or advise noninterference altogether, as with extreme
cultural relativists. I have already criticized extreme relativism for its unwillingness to address
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human rights abuses and extreme universalism for its inherent ethnocentrism. However, a
number of moderate schemes can fail when applied to the diversity of human rights abuses. As
Sen and Nussbaum note (Nussbaum 2006), large-scale examinations will often prove to be faulty
as well. Economists and global institutions determine human rights abuses by examining visible
statistics, like GNP or income distribution (Sen 1973). GNP and welfare economic methods can
be useful when comparing state resources, but this data does not inform advocates about the
actual lives of the people in these countries. Nor does it account for interpersonal distributions,
the economic gaps between individuals within states.
Approaches that focus on rights tend to be absolute, impersonal, and Western.
Furthermore, rights language tends to highlight negative rights, the ‘freedoms from’. This is
especially evident in the American constitution, which emerged from Enlightenment-style fear of
government control. Rights schemes are inadequate for both the individual’s right to happiness
and the family’s right to love and protection. They articulate procedures that may lead to a
specific outcome, rather than beginning with a desirable outcome and leaving the procedures
open-ended. Approaches that focus on utilities do not consider that people have variable needs
and variable access. Focusing on human entitlements tends to focus on what people need, not
what they could have. By the same token, rights schemes that focus on human functioning focus
on what people do and are, not what they could potentially do and be. At the same time, failing
to articulate rights entirely will not fight global inequality. Although rights language has been
unhelpful, defining a series of basic human necessities is not inherently unproductive. Such a
baseline is useful because it gives human rights advocates a measure by which to assess potential
human rights violations.
As a discipline, anthropology has had a troubled history with human rights discourse.
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Unwilling to endorse early rights systems because of their Western bias, anthropologists have
remained split on this issue, with prominent scholars arguing for cultural relativism,
universalism, and many viewpoints that lie somewhere in the middle of these two extremes.
Without a sense of clarity, anthropology will be unable to contribute to the human rights
movement. Yet anthropology’s attention to cultural diversity and unique knowledge of crosscultural relations should help to inform any global movement, ensuring that native voices are
well-represented and cultural heritage is preserved.

Anthropology will not achieve this

introspectively; human rights is an especially contentious issue and no single philosophy has
risen to prominence. Other social sciences have offered various models, but they lack the
cultural sensitivity that characterizes anthropological theory.
What anthropologists need, then, is a system that can articulate human needs without
imposing Western rights while remaining versatile enough to preserve cultural meaning and
apply to individuals across the world. I favor the capabilities approach articulated by economist
Amartya Sen (1973) and furthered by philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2002, 2006). As the name
suggests, this human rights scheme is designed around the ability to fulfill individual and
community potential. Rather than focus on the individual’s relationship to the state, capabilities
begin with the assumption that human rights are based on dignity, ability, and possibility. As a
result, they are more concerned with personal qualities of life. This approach is unique in that it
focuses exclusively on human capabilities, what people, or groups of people, are actually capable
of being or doing. Capabilities are distinct from rights, entitlements, and utilities because they
encompass human possibility. They stand juxtaposed to rights laws in that their purpose is fixed
but their actual implementation depends on the situation in question. Actors who follow this
model articulate their final outcome but allow the procedures that create this outcome to remain

24
vague. Their advantage lies in that capabilities address positive freedoms, can infiltrate the
private and public spheres, and are not linked to Enlightenment philosophy (Nussbaum 2006).
Thus, while traditional sociopolitical contracts have focused on procedures that maintain a
balance of power, capabilities encourage a result, equality and dignity, that focuses primarily on
human well-being.

When examining human rights, I contend that advocates can be more

effective when they concentrate on helping people achieve their human potential, in terms of
physical, mental, emotional, and social fulfillment.

This tool is especially useful for

anthropologists navigating human rights discourse or cultural politics because the capabilities
approach requires advocates to be cultural specialists.
Nussbaum explicitly lists ten base capabilities, which she believes to be necessary for
human functioning. These capabilities form a baseline, against which human rights advocates
can measure well-being. Her list of central human capabilities encompasses: the ability to live
one’s life; the capability to promote personal bodily health; the capability for bodily integrity
including reproductive freedom; full expression of sensory perception including imagination and
thought; emotional expression; the ability to employ practical reason with regard to one’s life;
the ability to affiliate with social groups and individuals without fear of reprisal; being able to
live harmoniously with the natural world; enjoying rest, play, and recreation; the ability to
exercise some control over one’s life, through some combination of political participation,
cultural or religious expression, unhindered access to the economic system, and meaningful
social relationships (Nussbaum 2006). People who express these basic capabilities can be seen
as above this human baseline while people below this baseline may suffer human rights abuses.
Nussbaum’s central capabilities differ from other rights lists in that they are intentionally vague
and open to interpretation. Rather than define what it means to live a good life, the capabilities
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list asks only that people are able to live one. This necessitates an anthropological understanding
of what that life would entail in multiple settings. In this way, each capability can be interpreted
in distinct cultural contexts without losing its essential meaning. In this way, the capabilities
approach is equipped to navigate universalism and cultural relativism. However, because the
essential meaning remains the same cross-culturally, advocates can know, and thus defend,
human capabilities.
In Nussbaum’s worldview, as articulated in The Frontiers of Justice (2006), these
essential capabilities are guarded by state and nonstate actors. Drawing on a liberal political
science philosophy, she argues that global institutions are capable of watching states and
identifying areas that need human rights support. However, she stresses that states are ultimately
responsible for helping improve the global structure. In this way, the responsibility for global
well-being is a shared among actors that have the power to effect change. States can do this
through policy, institutionalizing positive rights, or they can contribute material aid to areas with
a demonstrated need. Nussbaum believes that transnational institutions are capable of assessing
this need, in accordance with the capabilities approach. In such a process, both people affected
by a perceived human rights violation and outside observers must work together to ensure that
any outside response is both wanted and effective. By working together, outside actors can
overcome any sense of moral imperialism while the disaffected can realize their double
consciousness. It is important to note that Nussbaum stresses that her model does not provide a
grounds for interference. The capabilities are not designed to spur international agents into
action. Rather, they provide a framework within which international groups, states, and those
affected by human rights violations can begin cross-cultural dialog.
Although Nussbaum writes mostly about women and women's rights, I believe that the
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capabilities approach can be extended to men, women, and transgendered persons.

By

examining the political, social, and economic realities that constrain a realization of specific
goals, it provides a realistic vantage point from which to view potential human rights abuses.
Other indicators like GNP, economic development, political expression, or even asylum requests
can be misleading because they presuppose Western values. Judging by income standards, one
could conclude that successful hunter-gatherer societies exist in tragic poverty while a city that
undergoes sudden economic liberalization, deepens class divides, and compromises
environmental standards seeks to fight social inequality (Sen 1999). Such an approach implies
that human rights issues can have a quick, easy, or merely economic resolution. But real change
must be gradual, as with any shift in thinking. The capabilities approach examines human rights
within their cultural context, investigating "not only about the person's satisfaction with what she
does, but about what she does, and what she is in a position to do" (Nussbaum 2002:129).
Building off of Nussbaum and Sen's work, other authors (Gruenbaum 2001, Talbott 2005) have
argued for an autonomy-based human rights scheme. The most useful aspect of the capabilities
approach is its emphasis on individual context. Rather than impose values on other societies, it
examines potential human rights abuses from within local, enculturated standards. While other,
more general models use statistics based on human beings as the basis for their observation, it
directly investigates the grievances of those people. For this reason, the capabilities approach is
uniquely situated to provide a philosophical base for cross cultural dialog.
Proponents of cultural relativism criticize Nussbaum’s system because it claims to be
universally applicable. By forwarding a system of rights at all, it supposes that one existence can
be superior to another. In addition, focusing on individual autonomy, it ignores communal and
familial rights. These are legitimate anthropological criticisms, but I feel that they miss some of
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Nussbaum’s essential meaning. Yes, capabilities are unabashedly universalist, but their basis is
not in the Western political tradition. In fact, the rights to free affiliation and a harmonious
existence with one’s environment are decidedly contrary to European and North American
tradition, as evidenced by institutional racism and the environmental devastation that has
sustained these societies. Furthermore, Nussbaum’s list is intentionally non-specific and open to
revision. Capabilities are designed to be interpreted within distinct cultural contexts and applied
to the variable need that they express. On a culturally specific level, human existence cannot be
compared, and anthropological work has shown that people are products of the culture that
surrounds them. However, the capabilities approach argues that only an ideal life, in which
capabilities are fulfilled, is superior to other existences. The capabilities approach is neither
willing nor equipped to criticize cultural structures, only the way that people are able to act
within them. Nussbaum demands only that all cultures express respect for human life and
dignity, the human rights outcome. She does not seek to impose her own values on how this
respect can be expressed, the human rights procedure. This is the very essence of a relativisttempered universalism.
I feel that one aspect of Nussbaum’s argument does require special attention. In an effort
to preserve individual autonomy, the capabilities approach also possesses a strong individualist
tilt. Her discussion glosses over the rights of families and other communal networks. In fact,
citing institutional patriarchy, Nussbaum notes that families often stifle women’s capabilities.
However, I feel that Nussbaum is wrong to exclude communal rights from her list. Group rights
including self determination, the right to familial safety and privacy, and religious expression,
can work within her rights framework as outlined above. As numerous authors (Mahoney, 2007,
Moussalli 2001, Sahliyeh 2003) note, families and large societal networks have traditionally
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been excluded by human rights discourse.

As with Nussbaum, groups are portrayed as

aggressors. However, families and groups require similar protections in order to fulfill their own
capabilities. An extreme and individualist interpretation of Nussbaum’s argument could lead to
misinformed conclusions about social structures.
Although they form an important part of the international human rights movement, nonstate groups have no explicit rights to statehood under the capabilities approach. Ethno-national
groups such as the Tibetans and the Palestinians have tried to invoke the communal right of selfdetermination. When examined as part of the capabilities approach, anthropologists should
conclude that such groups have intrinsic rights to dignity, not to live as second-class citizens, that
are covered by Nussbaum’s list. Political expression of this kind is more a matter of recognition
by the global community, economic and resource rights on the national level, and numerous
international laws and treaties. It transcends both the ethical needs of individuals and the
fulfillment of human capabilities.
This is not to say that self determination issues are unrelated to human rights issues. By
denying a group nationality, the state can commit any number of atrocities, from denying full
economic or political rights to outlawing language. The capabilities approach is well equipped
to

address

these

particular

violations,

potential

consequences

of

state-sponsored

disenfranchisement. However, owing to its wide-ranging international political and economic
ramifications, self-determination itself lies beyond the scope of the capabilities approach.
However, it is equipped to deal with other types of groups that would benefit from an individual,
case-by-case examination of potential disenfranchisement.

While it is beyond Nussbaum’s

philosophy to advocate for political secession, she can speak to state policies as they affect a
current group, be it religious, familial, or ethnic. Fulfillment of capabilities may well lead to
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self-governance, but this is a procedure and as such it is not specifically argued for by the
capabilities framework. The capabilities approach is based in a social contract between leaders
and communities, namely states and individuals residing within them. The ultimate goal is not to
appease every political, economic, or even social aspiration, but rather to create an environment
of equal potential for fulfillment. By applying these rules to such groups, the capabilities
approach becomes both more versatile and encompassing. By remaining rigidly individualistic,
the capabilities approach can actually do more harm than good.
In many settings, the family is a beneficial structure from an individual and group
perspective. Although it sets certain restrictions on individual liberties, can anthropologists
consider these human rights abuses?

Many families protect, nurture, and care for group

members. American parents who give their children curfews do not do so to stifle personal
freedoms. Rather, they hope to ensure their children’s’ safety. Abusive parents who lock their
children in their rooms have crossed a vague boundary and committed a human rights
infringement. While this situation should not cause human rights advocates to conclude that the
family is an intrinsically bad institution, it calls attention to the ways that groups must be treated
with nuance in rights discourse. Fortunately, the capabilities approach is distinctly contextual. I
contend that both families and individuals are intrinsically worthy of dignity and respect. As
such, they should both share Nussbaum’s capabilities. The most reliable way of ensuring that
such groups do not oppress their members would be to examine context and the anthropological
meaning of questionable actions.
Nussbaum herself addresses another potential critique of her philosophy in A Plea for
Difficulty, an essay that responds to Susan Okin’s Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women (1999).
For the religious, the capabilities could be seen as another secular attack that seeks to undermine
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traditions including dress or the gender of the clergy. More secular critics ask the opposite
questions: at what point is religion harmful to the individual? Does religion hamper personal
capabilities? Do religious rights, customs, and ethical standards conflict with capabilities for
equity and personal freedom? Such questions would undoubtedly seem offensive to people who
see their faith as integral to their lives. However, this issue is not as philosophically complicated
as it may appear. The secular critique is ultimately misguided, because it assumes that “religion
has nothing positive to contribute to the struggle for justice, and perhaps to life more generally”
(Nussbaum 1999:107). In validating such a denial of religious thought, the argument not only
limits the human and group capabilities for spiritual expression, it damages the attempts of
religious activists who draw on their faith to combat inequity. Nussbaum cites Ela Bhatt and
Gandhi, both of whom drew on Hindu philosophy to combat the abuses of the colonial British,
but the list extends to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Frederick Douglas, and Mother Theresa,
among countless others. The capabilities approach demands that people be able to live in a
pluralist environment where both religious and secular viewpoints are respected.
To this end, she notes that while a philosophical liberal like herself might lament the
exclusion of women from the Catholic clergy, the kind of political liberalism that she espouses in
the capabilities approach would not allow such an imposition into church dogma (Nussbaum
1999). This exclusion does not prevent women from practicing religion and so does not infringe
upon a base capability, however unfair or even unjust it may seem to the liberal observer.
Claiming so runs the risk of imposing a normative value without any respect to the cultural
legacy of Catholicism and opens the door for any normative value judgments against other
societies. The value of the capabilities approach lies in its ability to draw a boundary between
human rights abuses and seemingly improper practices. The example of female clergy in the
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Catholic tradition illustrates the necessity for an assessment of severity and a cultural
appreciation for the practice in question.
That

said,

the

secular

argument

correctly

critiques

certain

patriarchal

and

disenfranchising structures employed by religious groups. However, rather than solely blame
religion, I believe this argument speaks to one of the central themes of this paper. The religious
practices that interfere with human capabilities result from dubiously authentic historical
practices. They arise, continue, and are revived as powerful people gain control over others.
The result is less a religious and moral institution, but rather one that reflects the political and
socioeconomic will of these elites. Reform does not call for a restructuring of religion itself, but
rather the re-examination of these historical practices. As Muslim feminists, Gandhians, and
religious liberals of all kinds argue, reform aims to draw religious groups closer to the true moral
and ideological tenets of spirituality and religion itself.
Cultural politics aside, the issue of religious freedom is an especially difficult issue to
deal with as a human rights advocate, anthropologist, or proponent of the capabilities approach.
Free religious expression is not just one of the fundamental capabilities – it has a long history in
liberal philosophy. But, taken to an extreme, work toward religious freedom can lead to the
claim of religious exceptionalism.

However, human rights philosophy and the capabilities

approach insist that no person can be stripped of their humanity on religious grounds. Once
again there is a need for some kind of scale to measure the difference. To counter religious
exceptionalists, Nussbaum argues that the basic protection of human life and happiness
supersede the need to continue historical or traditional practices. For her, God is just and does
not order humans to debase others; rather that mandate comes from other humans and carries
neither divine nor supernatural authority. Nussbaum continues this argument, claiming:
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To those who object that violating others is part of the free exercise of their
religion, we should reply as we do when a murder claims that God told him to do
it (and he may sincerely believe this to be true): Never mind, we say, there are
some things we do not allow people to do to other people. Or as the Bangladeshi
wife said in my epigraph, if Allah really said that, then he is dead wrong. (What
we really mean by saying such things is that a just God cannot possibly have said
such things.) (Nussbaum 1999:102)
The case of religiously justified abuse shows a potential for a clash of capabilities, in which one
right is used to legitimize the violation of another. However, the full set of capabilities must be
met if one is to fulfill their human potential.
That which the capabilities approach to human rights seeks to protect is the human. This
is not a scheme for the equal protection of ideas or ideologies, because these can be used to
justify actions that limit functioning or capabilities.

This framework maintains that the

protection of human capabilities supersedes the protection of larger ideas. That is, tradition is no
excuse for torture. Those extreme views that cause members of a society to harm and unequally
treat their fellow community members cannot be tolerated or respected when their rhetoric
becomes a tangible threat. No matter how sincere, human rights supporters and anthropologists
should and must oppose any actions that threaten the equality of the community.
The capabilities approach entails several key assumptions that inform its conclusions on
human rights issues. First, it assumes that all human life is valuable and that all people have
intrinsic worth by merit of their humanity alone. In the just world that human rights advocates
work to create, there is no natural state in which one human is inferior or superior to another. All
people are fundamentally equal and possess an equal degree of worth. This is the key value of
respect, in which actors value each other’s culture and history and approach cross cultural dialog
from a position of equality. This value is indisputable and no cultural relativism can challenge
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this basic tenet. Thus, the relativist critique that guards against imposition cannot threaten one’s
humanity. Women, men, and transgendered people of all religions, ethnic backgrounds, and
cultures possess inalienable human dignity, and deserve to have that dignity respected. This
belief comes from Nussbaum’s familiarity the works of John Rawls and John Stuart Mill, who
considered dignity, equality, and respect to be key foundations for human rights, and from her
conviction in Humanism (Nussbaum, 1999).

I would hope that anthropologists could

comfortably endorse this assumption.
As a ramification of this assumption, the capabilities approach also assumes that pluralist
society is beneficial. By pluralist, I refer to a society in which all people can coexist peacefully,
in which no single demographic asserts an advantage over another by virtue of sex, heritage,
sexual orientation, religion, or cultural background. Pluralism only ensures that the full diversity
of a population can affect its own well-being. The capabilities approach does not offer any
specific means of achieving this environment and, rather than being western-centric, criticizes
American and European states for their hierarchical societies. Because it violates the capability
for a full and dignified life, violence must be viewed as detrimental to human existence. Thus,
the capabilities approach would have anthropologists universally condemn acts of injustice
against any people, despite a cultural precedent. In order for an individual to recognize injustice,
they must be aware of their own situation and of an alternative. The individual must then be able
to make a competent value judgment to determine if his or her capabilities are being limited by
the situation in question. In short, the capabilities approach is dependent upon sufficient access
to resources, be it some form of education or other way of evaluating one’s potential human
rights abuse in context. In this way, the individual can ensure that their choice is neither
spontaneous nor already decided by an outside force (Nussbaum 1995). That is, the capabilities
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approach relies on one’s ability to form a double-consciousness.
Finally, it assumes that individual rights are centrally important, as explained above. As
such, groups are institutions through which individual rights can be respected or denied. Thus
group rights fit with the capabilities approach only when they do not seek to compromise one’s
personal autonomy. Nussbaum does not support a tyranny of the majority; on the other hand,
history shows that family ties can be enormously helpful in protecting individuals from social
and physical dangers. A person’s stated desire, as identified by NGOs and ethnographers alike,
is an insufficient guide for rights workers when compared to their actual functioning and
abilities. Therefore, any individual rights, as expressed through capabilities, cannot impinge on
the rights of others, limit their capabilities, or hamper one’s perspective when forming a doubleconsciousness.
I argue the idea that cultural politics, the way in which culture is represented and
appropriated by both authoritarian regimes and human rights advocates, and postcolonial
political and socioeconomic factors, is responsible for a perceived incompatibility between Islam
and human rights. Furthermore the capabilities approach is uniquely situated to deal with
ambiguous rights or rights pertaining to cultural artifacts. Three case studies are particularly
valuable for addressing these gray area rights: female genital cutting, the veil, and ideas of
democracy. Each of these cultural constructions are often perceived as human rights issues by
Western observers looking to the Middle East and North Africa. While traditional human rights
or feminist approaches tend to frame these as simple problems, easily remedied by informed
activists, the capabilities approach enables human rights advocates to fully realize their
complexity and cultural significance. With this relativistic outlook, we can appropriately engage
in cross cultural dialog and work toward a positive outcome. This will recognize the political,
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economic, and social fabric surrounding the veil, female genital cutting, and democracy while
providing the tools to better understand them.
In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, veiling and female genital cutting can be
interpreted as human rights violations under the articles guaranteeing the right to personal liberty
and security (article 3), forbidding degrading treatment (article 5), forbidding interference with
privacy and family (article 12), freedom of opinion and expression (article 19), and guaranteeing
security of family and motherhood (article 25). From this, one could conclude that these cultural
articles are incompatible with human rights law.

However, I contend that the Universal

Declaration is merely ill-equipped to address these perceived incompatibilities. In examining
these issues, I will investigate the historical, cultural, social, economic, and political significance
of each while reinforcing that culture itself is fully equipped to fulfill autonomous capabilities.

Female Genital Cutting

Female genital cutting is one of the most hotly contested human rights issues in North
Africa, in part because it is defended as a cultural right. Western feminist groups, women's
rights activists, African governments, and the World Health Organization have all criticized this
practice while individual communities, including the women, insist on the procedure.

Its

relationship with Islam is complicated and ambiguous, and its original significance in cultural
constructions of gender and adulthood has become appropriated by postcolonial discourse. In
short it can be seen as both an abuse and a right, depending on one’s orientation within cultural
politics.
The term itself is subject to scrutiny.

Depending on one's perspective, it is called
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circumcision, cutting, or mutilation.

Designating the practice circumcision draws a false

comparison to male circumcision, a procedure far less dangerous or invasive.

Although I

personally believe that mutilation is often accurate, the word's severity and connotations insult
the tradition, its cultural meaning, and the people who perform the procedure without
distinguishing between mild and severe forms. Mutilation, although strong enough to capture
the imagination of Western human rights advocates, is an impractical term for cross cultural
dialog. I use 'cutting' because it accurately describes the process without passing judgment.
Female genital cutting (FGC) is not a single, defined procedure. As a blanket term, the
World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) issued an April 1997 joint statement defining FGC as "all
procedures involving partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or other injury to
the female genital organs whether for cultural or other non-therapeutic reasons" (WHO 1998:6).
As a procedure, FGC has a considerable range with respect to severity and tradition. Several
sources (Skaine 2005, Billet 2007, WHO 1998, Gruenbaum 2001, El Guindi 2006) agree on four
variable methods of FGC. The first method, clitoridectomy, is the most common and least
severe. Most often, the clitoral prepuce is cut and the clitoris may be pricked, cut, or removed.
Classified as Sunna, or tradition, this is the method that Mohammed encountered, which
subsequent Muslims defend on Islamic grounds. The second method, excision, is more variable.
Excision involves the removal of all or part of the clitoris as well as the all or part of the labia
minora. Subsequent scarring may cover the vaginal opening. According to the WHO (1998),
methods one and two account for 80-85% of FGC procedures. Type three is the most severe and
invasive, known alternately as pharonic circumcision, Sudanese circumcision, or infibulation.
During this procedure, most or all of the external genital tissue is removed. The remaining tissue
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is then sewn back in place while the legs are bound to ensure that the wound heals properly. The
resulting scar covers most of the vagina, creating a physical barrier for intercourse. The people
performing the procedure leave an opening that allows menstrual blood and urine to flow. The
fourth category covers all other procedures not previously discussed by the other three, including
stretching, piercing, pricking, cauterizing, other cutting, or introducing corrosive materials to the
genitals.

This involved and potentially dangerous process remains in place because of its

historical precedent, cultural importance, and socioeconomic function.
FGC has a long history, one that predates both Islam and the nation-state. The earliest
documented accounts show that FGC was practiced in North Africa well before Christ's birth.
The process is old enough to have lost its original tribal affiliation, and historians speculate that
it could have originated anywhere from the heart of Africa to Phoenicia. Certainly, FGC spread
to Egypt by 484 B.C., as archaeologists have uncovered mummies displaying the procedure
(Billet 2207). Greek explorers noted the process throughout the Red Sea area and a Greek
papyrus dating from 163 B.C. describes FGC as a necessary marriage rite (Billet 2007, Skaine
2005). Many communities believe that the process began with Islam or that Muslims are
responsible for its prevalence (Billet 2007, El Guindi 2006).

Ayaan Ali (2007) suggests that

Islam's emphasis on purity perpetuates FGC, but historically speaking, this is equally due to a
geographic coincidence.

I should note that in some rural areas, Jewish and Christian

communities are also enculturated to perform FGC, although no major texts mention it (Billet
2007, Saadawi 1997). Geographic affinity proves to be a more accurate predictor of the process
than religion. The Koran does not explicitly mention FGC (Billet 2007, Saadawi 1997, AbuSahlieh 2006), so the Islamic connection stems forms Mohammed's sayings in the Hadith. When
he encountered FGC, the prophet neither advised nor condemned it, leaving it as an option for
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communities; in the event that it was practiced, Mohammed advised that the women take care
not to go "too far". Some Muslims argue that because they trace their descent through Ishmael,
son of Abraham and Hagar, and Hagar underwent FGC, the practice is a part of their heritage
(Abu-Sahlieh 2006). Although this may appear to provide an Islamic sanction, El Guindi notes
(2006) that most Muslims see this explanation as somewhat weak. Rather, because the Sunna
version of the procedure did not conflict with Islam, it kept its traditional place in the new world
order. It is also important to note that not all Muslim states practice FGC, including Pakistan,
Algeria, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq (Nussbaum 1999).

Owing to the religious

character of states like Iran and Saudi Arabia, one can see that religion plays a secondary role to
tradition.
Although some doctors and scholars in the East and West debated the issue, FGC
remained primarily in the personal realm, as with male circumcisions. The process is not a
solely Islamic practice.

In more recent times, European and American doctors performed

clitoridectomies as late as the 1950s for "improving female mental health, discouraging
lesbianism, and reducing the incidence of masturbation" (Maguigan 2002:242). In the light of
postcolonialism, some communities have taken offense to Western human rights workers who do
not appreciate FGC's cultural significance, viewing human rights discourse as a new means of
denial and oppression (Gruenbaum 2001). Regardless of their geographic origin, the actual
procedures of FGC remain relatively unchanged since their beginning. By contrast, the original
cultural significance of FGC has become largely appropriated by cultural politics.
FGC primarily functions as a rite of passage that prepares girls for puberty and marriage.
Although the world has changed since FGC began, it continues to serve this purpose. When
examined through a cultural lens, the ideal procedure, unaffected by political, social, or
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economic forces, takes place as part of a ritualized coming of age ceremony. As described by
John Mbiti (1990) and Ellen Gruenbaum (2001), the local community gathers to welcome the
girls into adult society. This ceremony is complete with a party, food, drink, ululation, dancing,
and even presents. Mbiti and Gruenbaum cite the belief that children are born with gender
ambiguity. This liminality is physically expressed in boys through their foreskin and in girls
through their external genitalia. In speaking about the Akamba, an ethnic group from Kenya,
Mbiti writes:

The cutting of the skin from the sexual organs symbolizes and dramatizes
separation from childhood: it is parallel to the cutting of the umbilical cord when
the child is born. The sexual organ attaches the child to the state of ignorance, the
state of inactivity and the state of potential impotence (asexuality). But once that
link is severed, the young person is freed from that state of ignorance and
inactivity. He is born into another state, which is the stage of knowledge, of
activity, of reproduction. So long as a person is not initiated, he cannot get
married and he is not supposed to reproduce or bear children (Mbiti 1990:120).
Genital cutting, in boys and girls, is designed to foster group identity and responsibility. For
girls, it symbolizes a mature readiness to bear children, contributing to the community's survival.
Gruenbaum (2001) notes that communities may ostracize people who do not undergo genital
cutting. Ethnic identity, family loyalty, and sexuality all come into question when a person
refuses to initiate.
Certain Middle East and North African communities place a significant cultural value on
virginity before marriage (Ali 2007, Gruenbaum 2001).
symbolizes the community's moral conviction.

This increases the dowry and

The infibulation procedures serve a social

purpose as physical chastity belts, projecting the girl's virginity and community's honor. As
Gruenbaum shows, because the scar tissue would not actually prevent sexual activity,
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infibulation does not ensure virginity itself, but rather the idea of virginity. For the woman in
question, FGC is a lasting, physical reminder of this communal commitment to morality, purity,
ethnicity, and responsibility.
Fadwa El Guindi's work (2006) with the Copts in Egypt suggests a physical motivation as
well. El Guindi notes that women see uncut genitalia as ugly and primitive. By contrast, women
who do undergo FGC are seen as beautiful, demasculinized, and religiously pious (Shweder
2002). Surprisingly, although many religious and Western observers, including the WHO (1997)
and the men featured in El Guindi's research and Ellen Gruenbaum's 2001 ethnography of
Sudanese women, view FGC as a process designed to inhibit sexual activity, women do not
appear to suffer a devastating lack of sensitivity or sexual ability. In fact, both the Copts and the
Sudanese women encountered by Gruenbaum believed that FGC actually heightened sexual
experience, especially for their men. This rationale also reflects ethnic pride and identity,
perpetuating a belief that, as a woman told El Guindi, "circumcision makes a woman nice and
tight. The man finds great pleasure in tight women, unlike Cairo women whose vaginas are wide
enough for four men to enter together" (El Guindi 2006:32). In this way, genital cutting is
perceived as sexually empowering.
With all of this cultural significance, why have the WHO (1998), American and
international law (Maguigan 2002), and numerous internal and external women's rights groups
(Gruenbaum 2001, Skaine 2005) have labeled FGC as a human rights abuse? The WHO notes
the following medical complications: bleeding, shock, infection, urine retention, pain, failure to
heal, abscess formation, dermoid cysts, keloids (scar tissue), UTI, scar neuroma, painful sex,
increased risk of transmission due to instruments and increased bleeding, pseudo-infibulation
(healing with vulval adhesions), reproductive tract infections, dysmenorrhoea (painful
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menstruation), chronic urinary tract obstruction, urinary incontinence, stenosis of the artificial
opening of the vagina, complications of labor and delivery, injury to neighboring organs, painful
sexual intercourse and associations therein, and susceptibility to disease and infection (WHO
1998). FGC is most often performed by midwives or community members rather than trained
medical officials (Gruenbaum 2001, Skaine 2005), increasing risk of infection, uncontrolled
bleeding, and potential tissue damage. Transferring HIV/AIDS is a notable risk as the people
performing the procedure often use the same tools on multiple women with only minimal
cleaning. Gruenbaum (2001) observed a women cleaning her tools by placing them in a dish of
warm water. This disregard for hygiene is unacceptable in a region where HIV/AIDS is so
prevalent.
While women still experience sexual pleasure and stimulation, FGC can greatly reduce
this sensitivity. As Ali (2007) notes, sex can be extremely painful as a result of more severe
procedures, resulting in an emotional association with pain, fear, and sexuality.

Although

Richard Shweder (2002) correctly argues that mental and emotional health after FGC have
yielded inconclusive results (Shweder 2002, WHO 1998), I disagree with his assertion that "the
risk of death associated with these operations compares quite favorably with the risks associated
with many activities that are routine in our own lives, such as driving a car" (Shweder 2002:232),
an analogy is flawed on several levels. Most importantly, the act of driving a car is not intended
to cause physical harm. It also compares FGC to a mundane western practice—FGC is anything
but routine.

The process entails both significant cultural meaning and physical risk.

In

comparing FGC to driving a car, Shweder ignores intent. The dangers of automobiles result
from accidents and mistakes; the dangers of FGC are inherent in the practice.
With respect to religion, FGC is barely mentioned in any Islamic texts. The sunna label
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gives tacit support to the practice but that merely serves to validate an existing tradition rather
than give any new direction. Inevitably, this ambiguity gives support to pro-circumcision and
anti-circumcision advocates. Ali (2007) agrees, noting that while the Qu'ran offers no persuasive
commentary in favor of FGC, Islam's traditional view of chastity and purity reinforce the
practice as a means of ensuring this morality. In a survey of contemporary Muslim writing, AbuSahlieh (2006) notes that Islam offers no divine instruction regarding FGC. At best, the prophet
observed the practice and religious scholars offered commentary on his observations in later
years. The idea is further complicated by Fadwa El Guindi’s work (2006) with Egyptian Copts,
a Christian group that practices FGC and lampoons the Muslim women of Cairo. If we are to
take a liberal approach to Islamic tradition, then we can conclude, with al-'Ashmawy (1998), that
humans are fallible and their words are open to interpretation and change. Thus, Islam does not
mandate or justify FGC.
And yet, women across the region insist that they and their daughters undergo FGC (El
Guindi 2006, Gruenbaum 2001, Maguigan 2002). The cultural reasons explored previously
explain its symbolic significance but not its perpetuation. Many cultures perform marriage and
coming-of-age rites, but few are as potentially dangerous as FGC. For that explanation, we must
examine the socioeconomic forces within the communities that practice genital cutting. In many
rural areas, women cannot marry without first undergoing this rite of passage. FGC increases
their marketability by reinforcing their presumed virginity and purity. Because this standard is
not applied to men and, in effect, forces women to undergo genital cutting, I would qualify this
practice as an extension of institutional patriarchy.
Perpetuated by social structure rather than individual demands, it imposes a potentially
dangerous surgery on women so that they will be more acceptable for a prospective suitor. While
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this kind of marital selection is a social decision, it has important legal consequences. Samuel
Martinez's 2005 essay Searching for a Middle Path: Rights, Capabilities, and Political Culture
in the Study of Female Genital Cutting addresses the complications of legal standing for women
living in this region. An unmarried woman will have poor social, legal, and economic standing.
Because of these detriments women in North Africa are often the staunchest supporters of FGC.
Sudanese women, for example, value the practice because they see “marriage [as] the entry gate
to family formation. FGC is the ticket to pass through this gate and from thence to gain access to
respect, a more reliable livelihood, and a stronger assurance of care and subsistence in old age
than could be obtained by foregoing a socially-legitimate conjugal union” (Martinez 2005:37).
Women call for this procedure as it may be the only way they can fulfill their full economic
potential.

Besides maintaining their family's honor, married women are able to run their

household and conduct business. Though these are domestic goals they are unattainable by
unmarried (uncut) women.
Gruenbaum and Martinez draw a parallel to the Chinese process of foot-binding.
Honorable women bound their feet: “similarly to FGC it was necessary for a proper marriage, for
the virtue of the woman, and for the honor of her family” (Martinez 2005:36). Yet human rights
activism successfully addressed foot-binding without compromising the Asian values of familial
honor through a three-part education campaign. First, activists informed the Chinese of an
alternative; that is knowledge of other cultures that did not bind feet. Then they distributed
information about the detrimental health effects of foot binding in Chinese cultural terms.
Finally activists encouraged the formation of groups that agreed not to bind their daughter's feet
and forbade their sons from marrying women with bound feet.
This process eventually leads to the audience theory of culture change. If an audience is
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standing, then sitting is both forgotten and inapplicable to the situation. However once a “critical
mass of people in the audience can be organized to sit, they realize that they can attain both the
ease of sitting and a clear enough view of the stage” (Martinez 2005:35). If enough families
agree to stop practicing FGC, then they could marry among each other. Once this “critical mass”
has been reached, FGC may literally fall out of fashion.

This may seem simplistic, but as

Martinez explains, it succeeded in China. Of course, China is a product of Asian values while
African and Islamic nations are a product of their own values; the foot-binding example is
analogous rather than defining. However, there are encouraging signs. Human rights groups
have successfully implemented health awareness campaigns and designed non-harmful initiation
rites throughout the Middle East and North Africa (Skaine 2005, Gruenbaum 2001, Billet 2007).

Female Genital Cutting and The Capabilities Approach

Yet something is missing from this explanation, because it begins with the assumption
that genital cutting is wrong, it’s existence is harmful, and the women who agree to it lack a
double consciousness that would illuminate their subjugation. While this may be the ultimate
conclusion, activists cannot use these assumptions as a starting point. By allowing FGC to be
judged in this Western, normative light, human rights would open the door for any cultural
tradition to be scrutinized by the standards of a single moral system. Rather, Nussbaum provides
the solution with her capabilities approach.
So what can the women in question do and be? From the capabilities perspective, the
genital cutting process allows women to be functioning members of society. They can be
mothers and wives, they can feel sexually empowered, they can hold positions in society, and
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they can be culturally initiated. For these women, FGC is a necessary part of their social life,
one that allows them to participate in their economic and political structures. These capabilities,
named by the communities themselves and relayed through the cross-cultural dialog of
anthropologists and other fieldworkers, are crucial because they reflect the cultural importance
ascribed to FGC. Human rights workers cannot present a lasting alternative solution that ignores
these.
One value of the capabilities approach is in its ability to be reinterpreted in different
cultural contexts.

Every person has base capabilities, but they are differently defined for

different groups. By addressing social and economic capabilities, FGC can be seen as necessary
for some women. However, another value of this framework lies in its scope. Nussbaum is
uncompromising about this, and her system dictates that no capability can deny another.
Because of the health risks, emotional damage, and patriarchy that is reinforced by the system,
FGC denies central capabilities related to well-being. The social gains are negated by a physical
danger that is unacceptable in modern medical times. Additionally, the Functionalist argument
that genital cutting fills a social need is dangerously fatalistic.

The diversity of the

anthropological record shows that FGC is far from necessary or justified in a soceity that
respects the choices of its members. The risk of infection, especially of HIV/AIDS is reason
enough to campaign against the surgery. The harm that comes from an unwanted surgery or a
botched ceremony cannot be undone, and so violates a woman’s capability for physical, mental,
and emotional health. Parents who perform the procedure on their daughters cause this same
irreparable damage; they will never be able to change the decision and will have to live with its
consequences. Of course, the less severe the surgery, the less serious the physical damage and
the farther removed from a human rights abuse.
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For this reason, the comparison to male circumcision is fallacious and dangerously
misleading. Only the most mild version of the practice is analogous to the removal of foreskin;
an uninvasive, less bloody, and overall less risky process that does not limit or seek to limit
sexual ability. If male circumcision violates a capability, it is certainly less severe than most
forms of female circumcision. However, male circumcision is not performed in order to make
men more marriageable.

Its connection to historical and religious tradition has been less

distorted over time than its female counterpart and men do not circumcise to appear more
attractive to women. As this is an explicit concern for many FGC procedures, it violates a
woman’s capability for sexual fulfillment and control over her life. Furthermore, it becomes
farther removed from any historical roots in eliminating gender ambivalence and becomes
another method of patriarchal control. A family’s desire to control their daughter’s sexuality is
not inherently wrong, patriarchal, or subordinating. Promoting birth control, abstinence, condom
use, or other non-invasive and consensual methods of limiting sexuality may well protect a
child’s future. These means also educate young women about the consequences of sexual
activity and encourage healthy ideas about sex. Along a spectrum of techniques to protect one’s
children from the social, economic, and physical dangers of their sexuality, education,
communication, abstinence, or even birth control, in more liberal contexts, would lie amongst the
least potentially dangerous and limiting. This surgery, by contrast, is nonconsensual, permanent,
and physically severe:

it denies both the intent of the capabilities approach and physical

wellness itself.
The claim that FGC is a necessary part of beauty or enhances male sexual pleasure is not
foreign to Western feminists.

Dieting, eating disorders, or questionably safe cosmetic

procedures like Botox injections and pharmaceutical drugs occupy a similar place in feminist
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discourse.

FGC may inspire more outrage because of the physical actions taken, but this

motivation is ideological similar to the Western search for beauty. As such, it can be addressed
in human rights discourse in a similar way. Action, so justified, is not taken to improve the lives
of the women but rather to make them more appealing to men and is thus a form of masculine
oppression. Because there is a desire to make a woman more sexually appealing, cosmetic FGC
perversely reinforces the idea that un-cut genitals are unattractive and that women should seek
drastic measures to sexually please their male partners. Because men are not held to such
standards of beauty this asymmetric practice places women in a position of inferiority, which is
unacceptable in the capabilities framework.
The emotional and mental damage is far more difficult to quantify, and any lasting or
unwanted damage should be considered harmful. The social gain is a pyrrhic victory because it
forces women to submit to a procedure before they can participate in their social life. Because
the Koran is so ambivalent on the subject, FGC does not fulfill any real spiritual capability and
claims to the contrary refer to a misogynist interpretation of religious texts. Although many
governments officially oppose the practice, male dominated communities keep it in place below
the state level. The testimonies of female refugees (Ali 2007, Kratz 2002), the potential physical
harm to women, and the political consequences of rejecting genital cutting lead me to agree with
a more universalist stance.
Nussbaum explicitly addresses FGC in Sex and Social Justice (1999) in a chapter
problematically titled ‘Judging Other Cultures’. Nussbaum begins her discussion by arguing, as
I have, that circumcision draws a fallacious comparison to male circumcision. However I feel
that she goes too far by claiming that the “male equivalent of the clitoridectomy would be the
amputation of most of the penis [and] the male equivalent of infibulation would be removal of
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the entire penis, its roots of soft tissue, and part of the scrotal skin” (Nussbaum 1999:119),
because the two procedures create different results in a capabilities framework.

While

Nussbaum claims that FGC removes a woman’s capability for sexual functioning, ethnographies
like Ellen Gruenbaum’s disagree (2001). Nussbaum’s counter-argument would maintain that the
women in question did not have a reference point for healthy sexual activity.

However,

Gruenbaum has empirically tested this point in Sudan. Voicing her concern that the women were
unable to form a double consciousness that would allow them to see their own subjugation, the
community thoroughly reassured her that they engaged in a fulfilling sex life. At least for these
women, FGC did not inhibit their capability for sexual fulfillment. Nor does the process remove
one’s ability to reproduce, as the removal of the penis would. Through her comparison, she
actually does a disservice to those trying to apply the capabilities approach to human rights
issues. Her critique is not only misleading, it casts doubt on real testimonies of physical danger
and abuse. Ethnography is invaluable for dealing with an issue like FGC because it shows both
the diversity of cases and the real dangers involved, including infection, painful intercourse, and
emotional trauma. Nussbaum’s argument becomes stronger as she draws on real experience,
citing botched procedures and pleas for asylum.
The emphasis on physical damage also suggests that, if that danger could be minimized,
the practice would be acceptable for human rights advocates. For example, this argument
follows that if FGC were practiced in clean, well attended hospitals using anesthetic and parental
consent forms (as most of the women who undergo FGC are legal minors), then it would offer no
great threat to human rights. As mentioned above, this was actually the case in 1950’s Europe
and the United States. The health concerns are serious and should give cause for alarm, but they
do not address the more insidious means by which women’s rights are violated on the social-
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structure level. We must look past physical concerns to their functioning, what women are
actually capable of doing and being in communities that require the procedure. In this case, the
most important part of Nussbaum’s critique lies in her feminist approach. FGC plays a part in
perpetuating the dominance of men over women. FGC limits capabilities by creating a sex
hierarchy in which men are superior to their female counterparts for no greater reason than their
sex. Because the women in question do not necessarily consent to the procedure, this major life
choice lies largely with the men in their community. The denial of personal agency and the lack
of respect that creates it show that capabilities are being violated.
After weighing the evidence, human rights advocates can conclude that FGC has the
potential to fulfill and deny capabilities. But Nussbaum is absolutely clear that people must have
control over their lives in order to access their potential. In every situation, the people affected
must have some kind of choice. Because the only path to social life lies in this procedure, which
is potentially dangerous and unabashedly patriarchal, these women have no alternative. For this
situation to fully satisfy the capabilities approach, there must be a way for women to respect their
history and participate in their communities while still keeping their bodies, minds, and dignity
intact. Once an acceptable alternative has been found, and women have a free choice for
themselves and for their daughters, FGC may become obsolete.
The physical danger and social ramifications of FGC disproportionately affect women,
and it would seem that the custom has its roots in male dominated culture. The relativist would
argue that these communities are best left discontinuing or continuing FGC as they see fit. And
certainly, any activist that would fight against genital cutting would also risk attacking the
cultural emphasis on family honor and purity that surrounds it. But human rights activism does
not have to involve an attack on culture. By encouraging cross cultural dialog, human rights
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organizations in North Africa and the West can work together, introducing a new perspective
while preserving its cultural function. The key for activists is a gradual and inclusive educational
process. A capabilities-based approach to the audience theory is especially effective because it
correctly blames sexism on a political climate that allows discriminatory practices to hide behind
cultural values of morality and community. Equally important, the educational approach utilizes
human rights ideology while still showing respect for culture. Activists must recognize both the
importance of familial honor and of the ceremonial rite of passage. Human rights workers
should always endeavor to maintain the cultural framework of the people they want to help, or
else this human rights abuse will continue. Without the full understanding and support of these
people, activists seeking to end sexist cultural and political practices are nothing more than
imperialists or missionaries.

The Veil

In cultural politics, the veil is as much a symbol of Islam as the crescent moon and star.
Women's rights organizations throughout the world have criticized the veil as exclusive and
disempowering.

Several nations including Turkey, France, Singapore, Belgium Egypt, and

Germany have passed laws that ban the traditional headscarf, as well as other more
encompassing veils, in public settings (BBC News 2004, 2006). Italy and the Netherlands are
considering such laws, and British cabinet minister Jack Straw noted his discomfort in speaking
with veiled women (BBC News 2006, Bilefsky and Fisher 2006). Prominent Muslim scholars
are split as well. Muslim women continue to legislate for their right to veil in the West while
scholars like Fadwa el Guindi (1998) argue for a more tolerant stance on the veil. On the other
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side, popular social critics like Ayaan Hirsi Ali (2007) and Nawal El Saadawi (1997) see veiling
as a form of repressive and disenfranchising religious domination. Like FGC, the veil has a
complex history that has led to its perception today.
Although I will be speaking generally about 'the veil', the actual article is, of course, more
nuanced. Its homogeneity in law and in the international media is the result of both cultural
politics and general ignorance as to the garment’s complexity. There are several different types
of head or body coverings, each reflecting a distinct regional, cultural, and religious tradition.
The hijab is one of the most familiar to Western observers because it is a more liberal veil and is
common in Western settings. Literally a headscarf, it drapes over the head and neck but leaves
the face clear. The niqab is a more conservative garment that covers the entire body and leaves a
slit for the eyes, masking shape and movement. Common in strict Muslim communities, it is
known as a burqa when worn with a sewn mesh that covers the eye slit. This veil is common in
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Afghanistan (Ali 2007, El Guindi 1998). The al-amira is similar to
the hijab and includes a special fitted cap that covers the hair. The shayla is also similar to the
hijab and popular in the Gulf region. A long scarf, it covers the hair, neck, and shoulders. The
khimar and chador both leave the face clear but are more like capes than headscarves. Common
in Southeast Asia and Iran, these cover the head and neck but extend past the shoulders (BBC
2005).
Like FGC, the veil is a holdover from the jahiliyya, the time before Islam. Veils were
common throughout the pre-Islamic Middle East and North Africa for both men and women.
Hardly a symbol of repression, the veil empowered some women by acting as a symbol of their
high status. El Guindi (1998) shows that in ancient Sumeria, the veil was a symbol of feminine
power and domestic control while in Assyria veiling functioned as a symbol of class position,
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where only upper class women were permitted to veil. She continues, framing the exclusivity of
the veil as a Western construction. Whereas the Middle East and North African communities
veiled to assert their societal role, Christian and Greek communities veiled as a symbol of gender
hierarchy and deference to male power. In the early Christian context, nuns wore veils to
seclude themselves in abbeys and devote their lives to religion. In doing so, they effectively
removed themselves from the male dominated power structures. However, in Arab societies
where men and women veiled, the article did not develop as a means for gender segregation.
Rather than impose patriarchal rule on women, early veiling reflected the existing class structure.
Mohammed himself veiled to show respect to other men and, by the dawn of Islam, men of
various ethnic groups throughout the Middle East and North Africa veiled to show their class
status, gain supernatural protection, and as part of ceremonial dress (El Guindi 1998). Veiling
reflected rather than caused or defined existing class hierarchy. Socially speaking, the veil is not
an issue itself so much as the inequality that it represents.
Islam adopted the veil as a traditional practice and offered little new direction.

In

mentioning the veil, the Qu'ran refers to the prophet's wives (Sura 33:53), covering one's breasts
and genitals, (not the face) (Sura 24:31) and distinguishing between 'decent' women and
prostitutes or slaves (Sura 33:59). Because of this, most contemporary religious enforcement
stems from tradition, the Hadith, and the Qu'ran (al-'Ashmawy 1998). Contemporary writers
(al-'Ashmawy 1998, Khan 1996, Jawad 1998) agree that the jahiliyya era society subjugated and
sexualized women throughout the Middle East and North Africa. However, this subjugation
occurred without the use of the veil.

The veil symbolized a new and progressive gender

dynamic, designed to protect women’s dignity.
Mohammed's reforms were thus motivated to protect women's rights, including property,
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safety, and modesty.

While some critics (Ali 2007) argue that veiling reflects a religious

obsession with purity, others (El Guindi 1998) note that purity and impurity are fluid states
within an Islamic context. Islam, unlike Christianity or Judaism, defines equality in its Genesis
story. Early Islamic thought and law protected the right of property and money, the right to
marry willingly and divorce at will, the right to education, the right to her family name, the right
to sexual pleasure, the right to inheritance, the right of election, nomination, and participation in
the political realm, and the right to respect (Jawad 1998). Modern Islamist laws that prevent
education, divorce, or political interaction are only sexist interpretations that keep the elite in
power, as will be discussed further. The veil served as another method of protection and Islamic
distinction from the other communities in the Middle East. Just as a yarmulke or crucifix,
Western observers should view Islamic veiling as a religious article when outside of its regional
context. Extending the metaphor, to fully respect a capabilities approach to human rights, a
liberal and contextual interpretation of the Qu'ran shows that women should have the option to
veil or not veil as they see fit (al-'Ashmawy 1998). If a woman believes that veiling or not
veiling will help her fulfill a religious or personal potential, then the capabilities approach
mandates that human rights activists and local laws allow her do to so. Both denying and
requiring it negate a woman's autonomy.
For a time, Muslim women enjoyed far more freedom than their counterparts in the West
as a result of Mohammed's reforms. Unfortunately, infighting and power struggles within the
religious and political circles ended any legal reform. As authoritarian leaders attempted to
consolidate power, reform became tantamount to treason and conservative interpretations
prevailed over more fluid social rules (Khan 1996, Moussalli 2001). Out of a contemporary
necessity, the Hadith, Qu'ran, and focus on female rather than male veiling, but that intended
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protection transformed into disenfranchisement as Caliphs, Imams, and hereditary rulers
attempted to gain political power.

Thus, the veil, a newly religious symbol of propriety,

modesty, and Muslim civilization, did not continue to protect women's rights. Instead, with sole
religious and political authority vested in a few, male, leaders, legal interpretation stagnated and
conservatives presented their own sexist view as truth (Monshipouri 1999). Rather than allow
women to continue observing equality, the veil was newly interpreted as a system of control
(Jawad 1998). In the 1960's, Islamism, following writings of Qutb, Maududi, and Khomeini,
would draw upon these fabricated ideas to disenfranchise women (El Guindi 1998), presenting
this narrow construction as a truth that gave men dominance over women.
In the colonial era, European powers alternately banned traditional practices and dress or
allowed them to continue, depending on the effect on regional stability (Said 1994, al-'Ashmawy
1998, El Guindi 1998). When the veil allowed free expression of Muslim faith, colonial powers
prohibited it in the name of modernization; when it kept women out of the political spectrum,
they allowed it. The postcolonial era witnessed a resurgence of Muslim pride, conflated with
nationalist identity. In many modern Muslim countries, to veil is to express cultural pride. This
is especially true in Algeria, where Muslim women used the veil to defy French colonialist
influence. Denied full expression of their religious and cultural heritage, Algerian women chose
to veil to symbolize their independence. Young women began wearing the veil in Egypt in the
1970's, and the movement has since spread to many other countries and Muslim communities.
Palestinians, denied their right to self-determination, veil to show national solidarity and instill a
symbolic unity despite their lack of a national identity. Many women veil as a gesture of respect
to Islam itself that “rejects Western materialism, consumerism, commercialism, and values” (El
Guindi 1998:145). Dress embodies a socio-moral code, a self assertion of a woman capable,
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intelligent, and distinctly Muslim. Veiling also gives women a way to participate in the work
and market environments without having to sacrifice values of modesty and purity.
El Guindi argues that the veil becomes an instrument of repression when it begins to
symbolize seclusion, silence, and anonymity, a point shared by the capabilities critique. As a
result of the postcolonial power vacuums in the Middle East and North Africa, some
communities have forced the veil upon their women. By following extremist leaders who
offered a return to tradition and prosperity after years of colonial imposition and poverty,
Muslim communities effectively ignored the vast potential for women's rights as established in
the Hadith and Qu'ran. The Taliban in Afghanistan implemented such a strict Islamic rule to
validate their authoritarian rule (Kepel 2002, Mayer 1998, Monshipouri 1998, Dorraj 1999). By
the same token, Saudi 'religious' laws prevent women from making a serious impact in the
political sphere, as evidenced when Saudi Arabia's highest religious authority condemned
women who advocated, unveiled, economic reforms.

Ignoring their policy suggestion, he

warned of “grave consequences” due to their “outrageous behavior” (BBC 2004). Keeping
women under the veil ensured that the regime would face no political or economic opposition
from the female population. Just as they opposed the Western influence that restricted the veil,
Muslim feminists oppose the mandatory measures. In such instances, it is a tool of class and
gender segregation wielded by politically powerful men. Ironically, this tradition is less Islamic
than Western.
The Hellenic gender ideology that would come to define Western thought maintained that
women should be segregated from men, practicing silence and submission. Christianity took this
idea and expanded it to the Catholic convent. Nuns veiled to symbolize their chastity and
separation from greater society. When Western nations colonized the Middle East and North
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Africa, they extended this view to a culture that seemed exotic and sexual. Through this lens,
they came to see the veil as an extension of the harem (El Guindi 1998). Colonizers glorified
this false perception with pictures of exposed, veiled women and “ethnographic” accounts that
promised visitors sexuality and immorality. However, this cultural explanation is an imposition.
The veil is a complex symbol in the Middle East and North Africa. On one level, it
symbolizes Muslim, Arab, or African identity as a tangible expression of regional identity. This
level is especially important when examined as a response to historical and ongoing bans. The
current body covering limitations in Europe provide legitimacy to those regimes that force
women to veil. Aided by the false East-West dichotomy, authoritarian rulers draw a contrast
between their own states and the repressive Western nations that legally target Muslim tradition.
On another level, the veil symbolizes a compliance with religious tradition. Veiling is
mentioned and advised, under certain situations and for certain people, in the Hadith, and Qu'ran
(Khan 1996). Western observers, drawing upon a secular tradition and their own ethnocentrism,
have a tendency to confuse religious devotion with oppression.

Linguistically, the Arabic

language connects women, religion, family, and community through a common root (El Guindi
1998) and women who chose to do so have every right to maintain that bond in their daily life.
Western observers should remember that empowerment can come from family and religion, not
just success within the capitalist system. Modesty, privacy, respect, and commitment to family
are not intrinsically disenfranchising tenets of Islam. Unfortunately, they are easily manipulated
in a patriarchal system, but we should be careful not to confuse male domination with inflexible,
divine instruction. In instances where a woman has the option and remains capable of fulfilling
her desired potential, we cannot argue that a human rights violation is taking place. Women
receive the honor of wearing a special veil upon completion of the hajj, often the final pillar of
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Islam undertaken (El Guindi 1998). Like the Jewish tallit or a military officer's decorations, this
veil connotes their new and higher status of hajja within the community; naming the hajja's veil a
human rights violation represents a gross misunderstanding.
Unlike the puritan philosophy that characterized the colonizing Christian West, Islam
recognized sexuality and attempted to incorporate it into the Muslim way of life (El Guindi 1998,
2006, Jawad 1998). As a result, the colonizers saw the Middle East and North Africa as a hotbed
of passion and sexuality. They incorporated harems, prostitutes, and sexual openness into the
greater oriental framework (Said 1994) that placed the enlightened West in a superior position.
El Guindi (1998) argues that part of the reason that the veil remains so unpalatable for Western
feminists and human rights advocates is this lasting perception of imposed sexuality and the
lasting Christian conceptualization of sex as dirty and shameful. If the veil were merely a tool
for sexual subordination, then outside observers could be justifiably concerned. However, the
veil is more culturally established as an indicator of status and social rank.
Dress, like the male and female genital cutting discussed previously, indicates
membership within a collective identity. This can be communal, ethnic, religious, regional, or
any combination depending on an individual's intent. Clothing reflects status in the Middle East
and North Africa as it does across cultures. Ceremonial dress will obviously carry cultural
weight, but ordinary clothes indicate an equal variety of significant values. This is certainly
present in Western society: business professionals wear suits to convey their professionalism
and competence; fashion magazines have made their fortunes on symbolic interpretations of
clothing accessories; popular stores like Hot Topic mass produce 'counter-culture' for teenage
consumption; many restaurants maintain dress codes that, along with their expense, exclude
lower socioeconomic classes.

Visual expressions of class superiority are evident in many
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societies, including American and North African communities, but the veil can have a secondary,
disempowering purpose.
Fadwa El Guindi's 1998 book Veil: Modesty, Privacy, and Resistance shows that, as with
any of those Western examples, Middle East and North African veiling has traditionally
indicated one's class status. Clothing facilitates the complex social interactions between men
women, and members of different political, social, or economic classes. High ranking women
veil not to protect their dignity from wandering eyes, but to command respect and symbolize
inaccessibility. In this context, a veiled woman uses clothing to symbolize her superiority to
others, including men. Women may choose not to veil to people whom they do not need to show
respect. Additionally, in many communities, adult women veil while girls do not. Thus the veil
connotes maturity and responsibility.

It immediately identifies a woman as a contributing

member of the community, indicating one’s passage into adulthood.

This status recognition is

not confined to women. In some communities, like the Tuareg of Saharan Africa, the men veil
instead of women and in others, like the Berbers in North Africa or students and teachers at
Muslim universities, both sexes veil. While showing status in stratified society, the veil also
symbolizes a connection to the past.

Veiling shows respect for one's history and family,

providing a tangible link to culture and tradition in a quickly globalizing world. Reducing the
veil to a symbol of sexuality alone ignores complex power structure that facilitates and
perpetuates the orientalist notion that the Middle East and North Africa are dominated by
sexuality and lack reason or complexity. Veiling predated Islam, Christianity, or Judaism and its
main cultural function, visually reflecting the existing power hierarchy, has remained intact
through iterations in each religion. Neither the religious nor cultural meanings surrounding the
veil are designed to disempower women or limit their capability to function outside the home or
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family contexts.
Recognizing their own historical oppression in other contexts, Western women's rights
groups have turned to the Middle East and North Africa, each spreading their own brand of
feminism. When this takes the form of cross-cultural dialog, sharing ideas in equal discussion,
both Western feminists and the women they seek to help benefit. But rights lists, government
mandates, or economic growth scenarios miss the nuances that arise during cooperative
discussions. Economic rights schemes that focus on national income or personal utility will be
totally ineffective when dealing with the veil. The human rights issues that arise from veiling are
issues of access, not of resource scarcity. A common feminist argument holds that politically
powerful men use veiling as tool to prevent women from leaving the home, conducting business,
or attaining an equal political status. In some parts of the world, veiling does serve this purpose
and ignores much of the article’s cultural significance. In other situations, traditional women's
rights discourse assumes superiority and advocates change from above rather than from within
regional context. Male-dominated families may force wives and daughters to veil in an attempt
to hinder their social advancement. Other women may veil to pay homage to a religious and
cultural institution almost fourteen-hundred years old. To accuse these women of having a false
consciousness is not only ethnocentric but also ignorant. Cultural relativism is an important
concept to keep in mind for anthropological activists; veiling cannot be universally judged.
Imposing orientalist sexuality and Western seclusion on the veil, feminist and human
rights discourse has come to see it as an abuse (El Guindi 1998). This false perception is
exacerbated by authoritarian regimes that follow a sexist interpretation of Islam and have
publicly defined culture within sexist parameters. Those regimes that legally force women to
veil remove their capability to fulfill their potential, thus committing a human rights abuse.
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Consequences for unveiled women in such regimes can be severe, including beatings, religious
stigmatization, or even death (Meek 2001). These draconian measures, imposed to keep women
safely removed from political action, cause Western observers to perceive veiling itself as
incompatible with human rights.
Veiling bans have created an opposite reaction throughout the Middle East and North
Africa. Religious scholars, authoritarians, and liberal women have all condemned the bans in
Europe and Turkey as persecution or neo-imperialism (Kepel 2002, Sadaawi 1997, An-Na'im
2008). This criticism is entirely justified because a blanket ban denies the capability for religious
expression and cultural fulfillment and thus denies human rights. Furthermore, this legal action
ignores any autonomous religious desire for modesty, privacy, and family commitment or
cultural connection to family and regional tradition. Unfairly criticized by human rights groups
as solely exclusionary and imposed on unwilling women as a symbol of national or religious
resistance, the veil has been appropriated as political leverage. Because it is so visual and easily
recognizable as Middle Eastern and North African, the veil has entered the realm of cultural
politics for both tyrants and human rights advocates.
Although women like Ayaan Hirsi Ali (2007) and Nawal el Saadawi (1997) have joined
Western feminists in condemning veiling as exclusionary, many women in the Middle East and
North Africa insist on veiling despite acknowledging ongoing and future possible violations (El
Guindi 1998, Bhutto 2008).

I have discussed the nationalist and identity motivations for

claiming the veil, but women also cite socioeconomic forces. Within states governed under
Islamist rule, women must veil in order to advance within their work and social structures (El
Guindi 1998). Saudi Arabia, for example, requires women to veil when employed (Whitaker
2006).

If a woman wants to work or advance in her workplace, she must agree to this
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requirement. Here, it is a tool of empowerment that allows a woman to exercise her economic
capabilities. While feminism argues that this rule reinforces institutional patriarchy, women see
it, at worst, as a necessary evil to work within the system. This differs from requirements of
FGC in that FGC is more permanent, less empowering, and most importantly, veiling at work is
a daily choice made by the woman. From another perspective, if a woman wishes to work but
also exercise a religious pride in privacy or display her connection to a deep cultural heritage, the
veil allows her to do so without compromising these desires. In veiling communities, refusal to
veil can negate the social status conferred by that garment and invite criticism, directed at both
the woman herself and her family. Thus, women choose to veil and retain good social standing
within such communities (El Guindi 1998). In doing so, they uphold ethnic or regional moral
and visual identity. This may seem to be an imposition, but any critics should keep in mind that
all societies have certain clothing restrictions. Americans cannot wear tie-dye, cloaks, or simply
walk around naked, for example, without inviting general critique or police action.

Veiling as a Human Capability

Nussbaum’s capabilities approach can navigate the cultural politics that surround the veil,
mediating feminist, religious, traditional, social, political, and economic arguments. Once again,
the focus must shift from the individual’s relationship with her government to the individual
ability to fulfill central capabilities. Anthropologists should endeavor to protect the capability to
veil along with its counterpart, the capability to unveil. In practice, veiling is integrally related to
the baseline capabilities of bodily integrity, free affiliation, and control over one’s environment.
In some situations, the act of unveiling can be grounds for social stigma or even physical assault
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(Monshipouri 1998, Bhat and Hussain 2007). In this case, choice is removed and veil becomes a
segregating symbol that reinforces patriarchal violence. Women are not allowed to live to their
full potential and, due to threats of violence, must defer to the male authority that subjugates
their action through the veil. Such action reflects the greater threat of violence against women
who would challenge male authority. The most that they can do or be, in capabilities terms, is
the disenfranchised women that men desire them to be.
On the other end of the spectrum, France and Turkey remove the capability for free social
and religious affiliation by banning the article. Women who veil in these countries now do so to
show their defiant pride for their cultural and religious heritage. Veiling prevents women from
securing employment and reinforces the orientalist notion of the Arab other, as depicted in
current cultural politics. Even by the standards of Western-oriented contractual rights with one’s
government, this action violates the freedom of religious expression.

From a capabilities

perspective, veiling bans challenge the inherent dignity of Muslim women and the respect owed
to them as human beings. Worse, because such bans apply indiscriminately, they ignore the
culturally specific environment in which women choose to veil. The capabilities approach is
especially critical of simple or all-encompassing human rights schemes: this is a plea for
difficulty. Criminalizing the veil institutionalizes the idea that the veil is harmful. As with
situations where veiling is mandatory, it creates an environment in which Muslim women are
afraid to consciously and thoughtfully express their religious and cultural worldviews through
the veil.

Women forbidden from veiling are not allowed to be religiously and culturally

observant, and are thus denied the full range of their capabilities.
Most importantly, veiling bans and directives both take choice away from women and
place it into the hands of political authorities. Women are forbidden from coming to culturally
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informed decisions about their own dress decisions. Any attempts to assert free choice in this
matter lead women to be publically humiliated, discriminated against, and even endangered. In
such an environment, how can women fully realize their potential? When the veil is outlawed,
some women may find themselves unable to be Muslims. When the veil is enforced, women
may be unable to assert themselves publically, whether by conducting business, holding public
office, or even fulfilling a social life outside of the home. By examining this issue through a
capabilities lens, anthropologists can consider the enormous cultural weight that constructs the
veil. This should not be done in opposition to family wishes; after all the family has the same
communal rights to dignity and respect as individuals. Anthropologists are well equipped to
work with veiling proponents or opponents to find a culturally satisfying solution that will enable
women to lead full lives without seriously compromising the family’s religious and social values.
More so than typical human rights issues like prison conditions or sex trafficking, veiling falls
into a gray category that can entail abuse but also fully aware religious expression. Universal
rights contracts miss the distinction while a culturally relative ‘hands-off’ position would ignore
the dangerous ramifications of forced veiling. Economic development measures like income or
GNP are entirely ill-equipped to deal with veiling as a human rights issue. To gage the function
and meaning behind specific situations, anthropologists must evaluate the freedom of capabilities
and treat each potential abuse on a case-by-case basis.
In reconciling perceived or actual human rights abuses stemming from the veil, human
rights advocates must first better understand the article itself. This requires real dialog between
human rights advocates, feminists, and women living in the Middle East and North Africa. In
examining a possible abuse, the case should be reviewed by etic and emic observers to ensure
legitimacy and pluralist input. Blanket bans that ignore cultural and religious rights are not only
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ineffective but also counterproductive. Similarly any, education programs designed to empower
women by removing their veils merely insult their heritage by falsely imposing orientalisminspired notions of sexuality and seclusion. Such programs claim an ethnocentric superiority by
assuming that Western concepts of modesty, privacy, and family are superior and therefore,
women claim the veil out of ignorance. This view is extended to the anti-veiling laws in
countries as diverse as France and Turkey. The capabilities approach can enable human rights
advocates to differentiate between an expression of culture and religion and an external
imposition. Such impositions can take the form of restricting or requiring the veil entirely:
neither allows for autonomy and both limit the possibility of a pluralist society. The veil itself is
not abuse, but its appropriation in cultural politics, by Islamist conservatives or over-zealous
rights groups, often is.

Democracy

Veiling and FGC are both relatively tangible cultural constructions. However, the idea of
democracy exists only conceptually. The right to popular and equal political participation is
guaranteed by article twenty-one of the Universal Declaration, but prominent scholars like
Sayyid Abdul Ala Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, and Ruhollah Khomeini have produced works arguing
that such a system is incompatible with Islam (Khatab and Bouma 2007, Moussalli 2001).
Conservative Westerners like journalist Daniel Pipes, Samuel Huntington, have forwarded the
idea that the Islam and the West are bound for conflict, and the popular media seem to agree
(Monshipouri 1997, Halliday 1996, Gerges 1999, Dorraj 1999). In asserting their political power
on the world stage, authoritarian rulers in Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and many other
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states in the Middle East and North Africa have refused to hold elections and grant equal civil
rights, citing an incompatibility between pluralist democracy and Islam (Kepel 2002, Dorraj
1999). Yet a growing number of scholars, including Abdullah An-Na'im, Benazir Bhutto, Fred
Halliday, and Ahmad S. Moussalli argue that democracy and Islam are not only compatible but
also fundamentally interrelated. In undertaking a liberal approach to both Islam and democracy,
we can fully expose the fallacious conflict between 'Eastern' and 'Western' values in cultural
politics through cross-cultural dialog.
Due to my own saturation with confrontational rhetoric in the media and popular politics,
I was surprised to learn that Shari'a can be a force for democracy. These ideas exist within the
concepts of shura and ijma. The shura refers to a consultation involved in legislation and legal
interpretation. This is the very essence of democracy. Developed in an age of monarchs and
dictators, it was the most inclusive governing system of its time (Moussalli 2001). The early
Muslim scholars even improved on the original Greek design, including women in the legal
drafting bodies (Jawad 1998). Here again, one observes that liberal Muslim demands for gender
equality are at least as culturally and religiously valid as the current disenfranchisement, and
more historically accurate. The shura also contains provisions designed to depose an illegitimate
leader. A leader who denies consultation is thus a tyrant and tyrants have no authority according
to the shura (Moussalli 2001). By this rule, there can be no truly Islamic government without
popular input and authoritarian regimes are illegitimate. Determined by the people whom it
affects, this legal philosophy has the potential to form the core of modern democratic Islam.
More importantly it proves that the construction of democracy, of legislation and government as
powers vested in the community rather than an individual, has an Islamic and Arab base. Far
from a cultural imposition, Muslims valued democracy at a time when the nation-states of
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Europe were still warring tribes, fighting over the remnants of the Roman empire.
The ijma refers to a consensus required before legal and executive direction can take
place. While the shura provides the discussion necessary for democracy, the ijma necessitates
that they should agree before acting (Moussalli 2001). What is this if not a code for majority
rule and a channel for compromise? Conceptually, in a society where the shura is comprised of
men and women of various creeds, colors, and religions, the ijma provides an Islamic direction
for pluralist democracy. Democracy is neither a foreign concept nor the newest iteration of
colonial domination. The notion that democracy and Islam are philosophically incompatible is
thus untrue. By its very definition, democracy is communal consensus and is ijma. This is not to
say that American or European democratic systems are well suited for the Middle East and North
Africa. Bicameral legislatures, parliaments, ministers, and presidents are all products of their
own historical development and any such system in the region would have to develop within its
own context.

But the shura and ijma outline a legitimate, Islamic base from which an

appropriate democratic government can emerge. The idea itself is firmly established in Islamic
jurisprudence. In this light, it is difficult to see why Western, Middle Eastern, and North African
leaders maintain that Islam and democracy are incompatible in cultural politics.

To fully

understand this issue, we must return to 632 C.E., Mohammed’s death.
To understate, Mohammed's impact on the Arab world during his lifetime was profound.
Religion aside, Mohammed united warring tribes and established the first Arab polity, one based
not on ethnicity or family affiliation but on mutual respect and a shared belief system that
included not only religion but morality, philosophy, and pluralistic peace (Moussalli 2001). This
state included not only the concepts of the democracy embodied in the shura and ijma, but also
social contract, constitutionalism, freedom of religion, and individual rights. But before this
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system, with the potential for pluralism, democracy, liberalism, and moral guidance could fully
develop, Mohammed fell ill and died.
His authority “was unique and cannot be replicated, because Muslims do not accept the
possibility of prophets after the Prophet Mohammed” (An-Na'im 2008:53). The state's future
suddenly fell to the far less capable hands of humans lacking divine inspiration. Mohammed's
death created a power vacuum and each successive ruler who attempted to claim the right to lead
faced rebel factions. The line of descent is so contentious that the Shia and Sunni Muslims
remain split, primarily over disagreements regarding Mohammed's succession. The early caliphs
and political leaders disagreed over the Qu’ran and Hadith, attracting supporters as well as
enemies. As each faction developed the Shari'a, the successive leaders or rebel factions defined
their rule as absolutely correct and their enemies as absolutely wrong. This environment led to
the wars of apostasy that followed the Prophet's death (An-Na'im 2008).

Apostasy, the

renouncement of faith, was leveled at political opponents to discredit their power and religiously
justify their murder. Interestingly, this same technique would be used seven hundred years later
in Medieval Europe by Catholic states who accused the Central European Hussites of heresy, and
then repeatedly to justify violent conflicts well into the nineteenth century. By labeling his
enemies as apostates, Abu Bakr, the first caliph, legitimized his own political rule.
However, this alone does not explain the conservative interpretations championed by the
most vocal and repressive rulers in the Middle East and North Africa, nor does it justify the
absence of democratic process in the region.

None of the leaders immediately following

Mohammed wielded sufficient political power or authority to confidently rule without
challenges, nor did they hold power long enough to feel comfortable exercising their rule
liberally. They followed Bakr’s example in an attempt to consolidate authority, but in doing so,
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sacrificed any institutional liberalization. Pluralism and tolerance were cast aside in favor of
greater control. Successive caliphs and tribal leaders would suppress any legal or religious
interpretations that challenged their rule, eventually eliminating six of the seven Qu'ranic
readings that the Prophet himself authorized (Moussalli 2001).

By appointing politically

supportive jurists and religious supporters, political elites maintained control over religious and
political interpretation, revoking the rights of ijma and shura from the community.
This time witnessed the passage of many disenfranchising laws and legal precedents
against women and other religious minorities (Bhutto 2008). By decreasing their political and
economic freedom, those in power limited their potential opponents to members of the
community with similar philosophical ideas and socioeconomic standing. Drawing on their legal
and religious authority, those in power were able to systematically reduce potential political
threats to those who wielded socioeconomic power. That is, they were able to consolidate the
tools for political and social change in the hands of those who had no desire to see the status quo
altered. Corrupt leaders paid off well-connected political dissidents while ignoring those that
posed no potential threat, using hereditary treasuries as their personal banks (Khatab and Bouma
2007). Some factions disagreed with this alteration and multiple factions broke into civil war,
accusing each other of kufr, or absolute unbelief. Interestingly, this is the climate in which the
laws condemning apostates to death emerged. In this context, an apostate is less a religious
heretic than a political dissident (Moussalli 2001, An-Na'im 2008).

As Muslim influence

expanded into Europe, Asia, and Africa, rulers made liberal cultural concessions and
conservative political judgments. In affirming their rule, politicians and religious authorities
worked together to maintain their own legitimacy while condemning political enemies as
apostates. They based their state primarily on the claim that their rule alone represented God’s
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will. This claim of infallibility gave the elite “a free hand, full power and absolute authority over
the people, the national income, and destiny of the nation. In domestic affairs, the people were
almost always (with few exceptions) treated as members of a herd rather than as citizens; as
subjects rather than brothers in Islam” (al-'Ashmawy 1999:76). This is a clear appropriation of a
religion that instructs that all are equal before God.
By the colonial era, religion and politics had both become so interrelated that the two
authorities were inseparable. In the race to maintain power, religious rule had become political
rule.

Unfortunately, Mohammed alone had the popular authority to combine religion and

politics. In addition to denying shura and ijma, authoritarian leaders also denied the right of
ijihad, interpretation of the Qu'ran. Muslim leaders from Andalusia to the Mughal and Ottoman
empires denied the right of printing for three hundred years after its invention, a tactic used by
the Christian world to limit independent thought (Bhutto 2008). By suppressing knowledge and
interpretation, religious and political leaders worked together to ensure that only their narrow
views on human rights, religion, and politics advanced. Over time, their opinions came to be
accepted as the truth, and authoritarian leaders today look to these false constructions to
legitimize their own rule. In her memoir, Ayaan Ali describes (2007) her religious instruction as
memorization rather than education. When she questions her teacher's interpretation, she is met
with dismissal, hostility, and even violence. This perpetuation of ignorance and dogma stifles
creative thought and denies political change.
Western colonialism appeared at the height of this fragmentation and repression. In the
name of stability, European colonizers allowed cultural and political practices, like authoritarian
rule and segregative veiling, to continue (Said 1994). In fact, the West continues to support
repressive regimes in exchange for oil or regional stability, as a number of authors argue (Gerges
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Saadawi

1997,

Chomsky

disenfranchisement all fit that bill.

2003).

Ignorance,

poor

education,

systematic

However, democracy and Islamic education were

systematically discontinued because they threatened to upset the balance of power in favor of the
colonized. In such progressive instances, the West disrupted any stability and deposed the
former political authorities. In their place, the colonizers artificially created nation-states, a
system that revived ancient ethnic struggles placated by Mohammed's early pluralist society
(Sahliyeh 2003).

By the twentieth century, postcolonial resentment led prominent Muslim

scholars to reject democracy along with several other Western philosophies that had plagued
them for centuries. While a minority of these scholars argued that Muslims should reject
imposed national borders and capitalism, the most influential voices chose to embrace those
ideas because they provided economic security and political power. Although a number of
reformers traveled in Europe and America, advocating a moderate approach that would preserve
liberal democracy and trim away geopolitical dominance, their writing did not emerge as a
dominant discourse (Khatab and Bouma 2007).
By the time of Sayyid Qutb's execution in 1966 the Islamism movement had come to
firmly reject Western democracy as an extension of the immorality and decadence that had
spiritually destroyed EuorAmerican civilization. Ironically, this systematic rejection effectively
reversed Mohammed's own directives in favor of a corrupt and rewritten history.

Despite

accepting market economies and industrialized society, Islamists justified their rejection by
claiming that democratic rule was a foreign, imperialist concept (An-Na'im 2008).

That

authoritarian rulers did not choose to reject Western currency, language, or international borders
suggests that anti-democratic regimes result from more than 'culture clash'. Khomeini, Qutb, and
Maududi came to believe that only an Islamic state firmly grounded in a particular version of
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both Shari'a and Islamic tradition would suffice for the Muslim world (Moussalli 2001). But
these men did not question the interpretations that they presented as the truth. Their rejection of
popular rule was influenced so completely by corrupt Western rule that they turned to the only
remaining source of legitimacy in their world: religion. Yet, as Moussalli (2001), al-'Ashmawy
(1999) and An-Na'im (2008) argue, a theocracy is, by definition, un-Islamic. A theocracy
demands that divine instruction be received and transmitted through a human executive or
executives. By definition, theocracies require prophets, and Islam declares that Mohammad was
the final prophet. Any contemporary ruler claiming divine inspiration acts against this belief,
both disobeying the Qu'ran and breaking Shari'a. When examining the ways that Islam has
developed historically and regionally, it is important to recognize that for capabilities work,
which focuses on real lives and actions, the most relevant religion is that which affects the lives
of the people in question. History simply shows how many different forces have shaped that
religion.
However, if we wish to use Islam as a guiding philosophy for government then, as AnNa'im (1996, 2008) and Bhutto (2008) suggest, we should turn to Mohammed's words and
direction, not those of his warring successors. That is, we should turn to pluralist democracy,
defined by the Prophet over a thousand years before acknowledged by the American constitution.
Rather than claim a dichotomy between Shari'a and democratically designed law, as this Islamist
discourse suggests, democratic reformers should keep Shari’a's interpreted history in mind. The
laws grew out of a conservative tradition and their human origins give modern liberals the
authority to advocate change.
Shari’a law was developed after political and religious authorities had restricted
interpretation and during the continual power struggles (Bhutto 2008, An-Na'im 1996). Its scope
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is thus defined by the jurists who claimed power. Although Shari’a was originally intended to
govern prevent individuals and rulers from gaining too much power, internal influence and
colonial rule caused it to take on a more conservative tone. Under pressure from political
enemies, Shari’a granted the authorities increasing control while its family and personal laws
grew more restrictive (Bhutto 2008, 1996). Ali Benhaj, Khomeini, Qutb, and Maududi's work in
the postcolonial era accepts these restrictive interpretations as the truth and presents democracy
as kufr (Tibi 1998). Modern authoritarian states, in turn, draw upon these philosophers and use
their work to justify human rights abuses and democratic disenfranchisement (Kepel 2002,
Dorraj 1998). In the newest iteration of interpretive control, they present Shari’a as immutable
and severe.
But Shari’a has a history of adapting to popular need or desires, whether social,
technological, or economic (Chase 2006). The vast complexity of Shari’a, as with Jewish
religious law and the texts of all three Abrahamic religions, lends itself to ambiguity. Because it
lacks legal consistency, it must be regularly reevaluated to maintain clarity and relevance
(Mayer 1998, Tibi 1998). Even under the most conservative approach, Shari’a, unlike the
Qu'ran, can be liberally interpreted and contextualized because it is man-made and relates to
man's relationship with others, not with his relationship with God.

Shari’a law is thus

amendable and can adapt to serve a purpose in the modern context (An-Na'im 1996, 2008). As
Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat (2003) reminds us, the idea of a stable and defined Shari’a is a
misconception itself. Subject to a regime's interpretations of the Hadith, Sunna, and Qu'ran and
even the jurisprudence of the Shari’a itself, Islamic law is far from homogeneous. Indeed, it has
a strong tradition of individual interpretation (Dallacoura 1998), aided by a religious imperative
to seek out knowledge, fight tyranny, and help those in need.

Thus, the perceived
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incompatibility between Islam and democracy is neither cultural, religious, nor even legitimately
legal. Drawing on a long history of political and religious interpretation designed to keep
struggling elites in power, exaggerated by colonial influence, interpreted as truth by influential
scholars, and appropriated by modern authoritarians, communities in the Middle East and North
Africa may willingly turn to tyrannical rule. To combat this eventuality, human rights advocates
must speak to Islam's cultural heritage.
Consultation, consensus, and interpretation, as defined in Islamic jurisprudence, ensure
that the religious community is capable of participating in its political sphere. To deny this
inclusion is to deny Mohammed's instruction and practice. With all of this religious and cultural
potential, liberal democracies could have replaced the colonial governments. This did not occur
for two main reasons. First, Western influence and aid kept authoritarian regimes in place as
with the monarchs of Saudi Arabia or the Shah in Iran (Kepel 2002). Second, opportunistic
political leaders used the influence of newly emerging radical Islam to legitimize their rule and
construct a dichotomy with the West.

Internalizing the old orientalist rhetoric, monarchs,

dictators, and religious authorities have perpetuated the idea that Western government works in a
way incompatible with the Middle East and North Africa. In global discourse, politicians present
the region as exceptional (Halliday 1996). Human rights advocates play into this false notion
when they claim that rights discourse should supersede Islam. Presenting such claims as attacks,
the religious and political elite uses them to further solidify their rule as sentries against the
imperial West (Sahliyeh 2003).

The cultural politics surrounding democracy have been

counterproductive on the other end as well.
Especially in American international politics, democracy is presented as a panacea to
social, economic, and political troubles. Empowered by its own internal success, US policy in
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the Middle East and North Africa has pushed for immediate political restructure in key
geopolitical areas. Echoing the domino theory of the Cold War, the West has attempted to
empower friendly regimes and support democratic movements to serve as buffers against
political enemies (Gerges 1999, Dorraj 1999). Double standards on human rights (Chomsky
1998), use of geopolitical buffers, and tacit support of unpopular regimes have further distorted
the popular conception of democracy in the region. Noting the West's clear willingness to attack,
as shown by the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan not to mention the war on terror, Islamists
can rally popular support by presenting Western action as a full scale war on the Muslim way of
life.

Of course, philosophical anger can only last so long in the face of poverty and

disenfranchisement. Perhaps for this reason, most influential anti-West action has often come
from wealthy, educated men. Osama Bin Laden and the Saudis who orchestrated the September
eleventh flights had assets in the billions. Frustrated by their religion's and nation's position
within the postcolonial world, they had tried, and failed, to assert themselves on a global stage
through Islamism.

But their movement, which had lost much of its support by the new

millennium, was revitalized by the 2001 terrorist attacks and the Western reaction.

The

subsequent violence and ethnocentrist discourse directed socioeconomic anger away from
corrupt leaders and back against the West (Kepel 2002). Democracy is guilty by association.
To advocate for democracy under the capabilities approach, I should be clear on what
democracy means. It does not refer to any specific political structure, real or imagined. Rather,
democracy as a capability refers to one’s ability to control their environment and employ
practical reason in the management of their life. This does not need to be accomplished through
voting booths as in the West or even black and white stones as in ancient Greece. There is no
single way to ensure that individuals maintain a stake in their political lives, nor should there be
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when we remember that the capabilities approach advocates culturally specific outcomes to
human rights problems. The idea of democratic government has been utterly appropriated
through cultural politics, to the point where its fiercest critics and proponents are more concerned
with its appearance than its function.

However, as human rights activists working in a

capabilities framework, anthropologists can focus on function, seeking to preserve and bolster
culturally meaningful methods of political participation. For the purposes of this discussion,
citizens are defined as community members because the idea of democracy is one that transcends
the Western idea of the state. By expanding the definition of citizens in this way, we see that
political participation is needed for an equitable relationship among members of villages, among
large families, and in other groups not typically associated with formal governments. For the
sake of simplicity I will use the word state but in the Middle East and North Africa, where
official states sometimes exercise power in name only, I use state to refer to governing bodies in
whatever form is contextually relevant.
In accordance with Nussbaum’s theory, democracy is a tool that communities can use to
ensure their engagement with the state, the fulfillment of their social contract, their protection
under societal rules, freedom of belief, their equality with other citizens, and the constant
protection of their personal autonomy. When the state denies citizens the opportunity to voice
their concerns and change political rules, it ignores their personal choices and decisions.
Allowing all citizens to influence policies, either directly or through elected officials, ensures
that a diversity of viewpoints will be represented in policy decisions. Because a simple majority
rule can lead to institutionalized inequality, democracies that embody human rights philosophy
will also seek out certain protections for citizens holding minority views.
Although the capabilities approach is primarily concerned with maintaining personal
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choice, it also seeks to ensure that citizens are treated fairly. In a state ruled by an elite, society
becomes classed, with first-class citizens enjoying state support and all others clambering for it.
By giving all people an equal voice in policy decisions and implementing their wishes,
democracy presents a way to prevent the domination of a single view, even when it may be the
majority view. Where women participate in their government, they are more in control of their
life decisions. Where religious minorities can voice their concerns and change laws, the state
cannot treat them with unequal respect.
As a political philosopher, Nussbaum devotes a great deal of time to the complicated
interactions between religion, equality, dignity, access, and the state. Her 2008 Liberty of
Conscience explores the development of religious pluralism in the United States. Drawing
heavily on the works of Roger Williams, religious philosopher and founder of Rhode Island, she
traces the development of a social contract between the government and society that forbids
religious persecution and refuses to show preferential treatment to a dominant religion. In some
cases, this dedication to religious equality of minority viewpoints necessitates certain
accommodations, such as allowing observant Jewish people to refuse to testify on Saturdays or
excluding priests from testifying against their congregants. States that draw on a particular
religion to inform their civil laws entangle themselves in a power structure that is inherently
unjustly biased toward that religion. As this idea evolved in American discourse, it became
institutionalized in the written constitution, a crucial step for reifying freedoms guaranteed by
political rhetoric.

Through clauses demanding free exercise and equitable treatment, the

government is restricted from exacting preferential treatment toward members of a dominant
group. The remainder of her argument discusses the various ways in which minorities can be
accommodated so that their capabilities are protected but do not infringe on the liberties of other
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citizens.

In the American legal tradition, the courts have maintained that religious

accommodations must stem from either a “significant burden” on the people or question. In
cases where accommodation can be overturned, this must result from a “compelling state
interest”. Tracing issues of new religions, religious education, and religious concerns with state
functions, Nussbaum charts the history of accommodations through the American court system.
Although its success in this system remains mixed, her argument makes it clear that
accommodations are a necessary element in liberal democracies.

Democracy as a Capability

In order for democracies to respect the diversity of human dignity and need embodied in
the capabilities approach, certain arrangements must be made to protect minorities. The majority
creates law in democracies, so special accommodations need to be made for those people whose
religious or personal convictions prevent them from serving the state in some way. Quakers who
conscientiously object to military service, a crucial state function, should not be forced to serve
because it violates their right to free religious expression. In the United States, this particular
issue was resolved satisfactorily according to the capabilities framework by Quakers who agreed
to work in hospitals or in positions where they were not forced to harm other people.
In cases where opponents argue that accommodations seem outlandish or seem to
threaten the state, anthropologists can use the capabilities approach as a means to filter these
arguments. Requests for a religious exemption from work should be respected as they are crucial
to religious functioning. Similarly, a democracy that contains religiously observant Muslim
women should allow those women to veil if they so choose (as discussed earlier at length).
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Democratic, pluralist states must also respect the views of atheists, polytheists, animists, and all
others who want to avoid compulsory religious services or religious education at state schools
that do not conform with their view of the divine. Even the most conservative perspective,
which views exposure to other religions or philosophies as a contamination and is thus
ideologically opposed to cross-cultural dialog, cannot claim that such states impose a substantial
burden on their citizens because no one is being coerced into believing or practicing religious
ideas. Nussbaum cites the case of The Holiness Church of God in Jesus’ Name, which directs its
members to handle poisonous snakes and drink strychnine, as one example of a sufficiently
dangerous practice that limits capabilities.
Capabilities require that religious diversity be respected as part of a democratic system.
Because theocracies establish a single religion as the truth, they necessarily give preferential
treatment to a single faith. The minority religions within such a state face an institutional
disadvantage if not outright persecution. By elevating one group over another, the state creates
classed groups of citizens; those holding minority views suffer the loss of their equality as
human beings. This is not to say that religion cannot or even should not inform civil laws. The
ethical codes found in the world’s religions have evolved to serve their communities and should
not be lightly cast aside. To do so would disrespect the religiously guided individuals in society.
Rather, anthropologists should “respect the space required by any activity that has the general
shape of searching for the ultimate meaning of life, except when that search violates the rights of
others or comes up against some compelling state interest” (Nussbaum 2008:169). Democracy
respects that the state interest, in turn, does not limit human capability. In fact, considering
religiously based morality in secular government is a good form of cross-cultural dialog, which
can result in equality and cultural specificity.
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Accommodation is an integral part of democracy and is the logical conclusion of the
ideas of equality and tolerance. It is the practical means by which the tyranny of the majority
can be avoided without compromising core values and cultural distinctiveness. Accommodation
is designed to protect not only those people who exist in contemporary society, such as religious
minorities, but also those people who may come to the society in the future. This system ensures
the longevity of a just state, open to the natural flow of immigrants and its own self-improvement
through the new perspectives that their cultural background brings.
The idea of democracy as a fundamental capability relies on the philosophical push for
equality for all citizens. In the political realm, this equality depends on equal access to the
structures that determine one’s life and input into the rules that govern it. In certain cases, when
rules asymmetrically benefit society, the majority must accommodate citizens with special needs
to ensure that all are treated equally.
To give democracy a sense of legitimacy and purpose in this context, human rights
advocates can once again use cross cultural dialog and the capabilities approach to break down
the false incompatibility between democracy and Islam found in cultural politics. By engaging
political leaders and liberal democratic groups, human rights groups in the Middle East and
North Africa as well as the West can work to present Islam within its proper context. Islam, like
Christianity and Judaism, can be interpreted to show an incompatibility with democratic or
pluralist rule.

However, Judaism and Christianity have survived a number of liberal

reinterpretations, emphasizing peace and deemphasizing monarchal rule, that allow them both to
function in a pluralist global setting. I disagree that this difference stems from the comparative
ages of the religions (Sahliyeh 2003), as it suggests that Islam, chronologically the youngest of
the three Abrahamic religions, is less mature or developed than the others. This is not only
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ethnocentric and patronizing but it offers a simplistic and ignorant view of global politics.
Islamism, as I have argued previously, stems from centuries of power struggles, interpretation,
and colonial resentment. But in order to survive in the continuously globalizing world, Muslims
throughout the Middle East and North Africa must reject the cultural politics spouted by their
authoritarian leaders as soundly as they must reject the economic liberalization that has turned
their nations into rentier states (Monshipouri 1998). The first steps in cross cultural dialog can
reaffirm the Islamic basis for pluralistic democracy as commanded by the shura, ijma, and
ijihad.
Within the framework of a nation-state, democracy, theoretically, allows every
community equal access to political representation.

In doing so, it allows individuals and

communities to both fulfill their political capabilities. By having a voice in the government's
direction, formerly disempowered groups will gain a peaceful means of addressing grievances.
Authoritarian states in the Middle East and North Africa that deny their populations such
representation do so not on religious or cultural grounds, but because they wish to prevent certain
parts of their polity safely away from any access to power. That is, such states deny their
citizens' political capabilities in order to eliminate potential threats to their position.
The fiery rhetoric of the religious and political elite does not necessarily reflect general
sentiment in the Middle East and North Africa. The communities of this region are no more
monolithic than communities in the West. Cross cultural dialog pioneered by scholars like
Abdullah An-Na'im (1996, 2008), Benazir Bhutto (2008) and Sa'id al-'Ashmawy (1999) has
shown both that democracy is an internal, not imposed, concept and that liberal and interpretive
approaches to law have a long historical tradition.

Human rights advocates can work for

democracy from within the cultural context, giving the democratization movement greater
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legitimacy.

However, Ahmad Moussalli warns against blindly accepting the imposed,

postcolonial version of democracy imposed by the West to promote stability arguing that it will
cause Muslims to “suffer doubly: first by the negative aspects of their history, intellectual
backwardness and traditionalism, and second, by the emergence of new and “modern” tyrannical
states and comprehensive conflicts as well as the states' control of individual and social life”
(Moussalli 2001:78). The ethnocentric trap occurs when human rights advocates, internal or
external, try to import a supposedly superior system without adapting it to a state's specific social
and cultural specifications. The push for popular rule in the Middle East and North Africa can
and should draw on outside ideas, including Western democracy, but its success hinges on its
cultural legitimacy. By disproving the notion of incompatibility forwarded in cultural politics,
human rights advocates can both depose their authoritarian leaders and provide legitimacy for
Islamic democracy.

Conclusion

In researching this paper, I have found a few common threads in popular human rights
discourse. First there is the idea of superiority, that Western Enlightenment philosophy is a
universally applicable idea. By extension, any actions or discourse that appear to conflict with
Western Enlightenment must be wrong or are at least misguided. More subtly, this approach
tends to frame non-Western ideas as pre-Western, as ideas that could be 'enlightened' with a bit
more development.
Such people malign female genital cutting as barbaric, uncivilized, or disgusting. Their

82
simplistic approach offers no respect for the long history, cultural significance, and
socioeconomic role that this procedure plays in the community. “Education” efforts that make
no effort to involve local opinion and interest imply a similar superiority. This disregard for the
validity of the process is completely contrary to the ultimate goal of the capabilities approach.
This same unproductive attitude is evident in Western feminists who see religious veiling as an
attempt to hide women away. This accusation contains the implicit assumptions that veiling is a
sinister patriarchal structure, that women who veil are ignorant to its true purpose, and that the
Western view of modesty, dress, and identity are a model that can and should be copied by all
others. The patronizing charge that all women who veil are somehow victims of the men in their
lives damages the efforts of progressive Muslim women everywhere. This argument is most
pervasive in the context of democracy. Fed by popular interest in regional politics in the last ten
years and by authors like Samuel Huntington, media pundits and analysts alike push for a
democratic system similar to that found in Europe or the USA. Others, citing Islam’s age at
1431, compare modern-day political affairs in the region to medieval Christian Europe. The idea
that Islamic society will one day civilize and evolve into something similar to modern Western
society is not merely bigoted. It assumes that the European model of political participation is
well-designed and effective in satisfying capabilities and denies alternative systems such as those
formulating within the regional or generally Islamic contexts. In a way, this recalls early
evolutionary anthropologists who believed that ‘savage’ people would someday civilize. In
effect, it closes the door on reform and a process of constant improvement by activists from
within this cultural setting. It implies that the West can learn nothing from cross-cultural dialog.
More damning, this argument effectively excuses those leaders who deny political capabilities to
their citizens by calling them products of their primitive time.
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Second, I have observed the idea of insularity, that no society should interfere with
another. Unfortunately, this extreme relativism allows rich, powerful geopolitical players to rest
on their privilege and justify their inaction. Insularity also conflates the complex interaction of
political, social, cultural, religious, and economic factors that drive a community's cultural
politics.

Assuming that any cross cultural observation is impossible because of cultural

differences presupposes that culture has been unaffected by centuries of conflict and contact and
thus falls short of a reasonable analysis.
This trend is evident in the long histories invoked to justify authoritarianism, segregative
veiling, and genital cutting. Those who perpetuate such human rights abuses cite their own
exceptionalism, contending that outsiders cannot understand their customs or that lives are some
detached from modernity. In the postcolonial age, where globalized trade has reached every
corner of the earth and humans have even begun changing planet’s climate, no group can
honestly claim that their culture exists in a vacuum. Only those traits that conveniently serve the
existent power structure are justified in this way. Certainly, none of these leaders intends to
forsake their material wealth, international recognition, or weapons in the name of preserving
traditional values. The only traditional values they maintain are those of patriarchy, control, and
greed. Insularity appears in FGC when relativists advocate for a ‘hands-off’ approach, turning a
blind eye to the unnecessary pain it causes. It implies that all cultural practices are equally
significant and beneficial to society at large and should be maintained in their current form at all
costs. In fact no cultural practice, FGC included, has maintained its complete connection to the
past. As part of the constantly evolving larger cultural context in which it resides, its symbolic
meaning has changed. Using the capabilities approach as a guide, a concerned observer will see
that communities who use the veil to keep their women from participating fully in their own lives
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are committing a human rights abuse. When those communities claim exceptionalism to prevent
outside interference, they betray their dependence on patriarchal control. When critics claim that
their disenfranchisement is simply difference, they malign the efforts of progressive activists,
regional feminists, and those who veil to show their faith and social identity. Insularity is so
encompassing that it eliminates the ability to recognize degrees of severity and to act
accordingly, on a case by case basis. In this way, insularity limits capabilities. Insular thinkers
ignore the historical inaccuracy and corruption of authoritarian leaders, placing them in a nonexistent cultural setting that excuses their actions. If this ideology is not out-right patronizing, it
is certainly ignorant. In such situations, it falls to ethical and concerned observers to act,
advocate, and help the disenfranchised. The ways to identify abuses of power and methods for
interfering have already been discussed at length. The extreme cultural relativist, aware of the
issues but unwilling to intervene, is as accountable for suffering and indignity as those who cause
it directly: inaction is action. In a way, insularity perpetuates segregation, genital cutting, and
authoritarian states by considering their actions to be completely exempt from any outside
scrutiny and discouraging the efforts of those who disagree. It is too late to be insular – cultural
contact has, is, and will continue. To be insular in the face of human rights abuses is to limit
capability.
I call the third trend reactionism, the tendency to disregard action and discourse because
of its origin. Islamism survives on reactionism, responding to the economic and geopolitical
domination of the West. In turn, the recent push for democracy and Western Enlightenment
philosophy in the Middle East and North Africa is due mainly to the impact of terrorism and a
vague fear that the region's culture and religion are determined to destroy the West. In the realm
of cultural politics, reactionism homogenizes one's own people along with their political
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enemies, transforming both into monolithic blocs. It constructs dichotomies and in doing so
stereotypes and encourages misunderstanding.
The political aspects of FGC and veiling both stem from a reactionary response to the
conquest and colonization of the Middle East and North Africa. In response to missionaries and
official policies that banned or restricted cultural practices, and capabilities, both of these
became synonymous with community pride. Such an identity relies not on a connection to
history, culture, and religion, but rather on the rejection of that which is different. Remembering
the lies of colonial governors, communities view FGC advocates with, at best, cautious
suspicion. Believing that the West brings moral degradation and living in a region prone to
warfare and interference by foreign powers, communities shy away from Western lifestyles.
Associating unveiled women with corruption and decadence, communities enforce the veil and
FGC. As the same foreigners that they want to avoid try to interfere further, they turn to a more
conservative approach that stands farther from Western norms. Misinterpreting this response in
the West, feminists and liberals lament the sorry state of women’s health and well-being in the
Middle East and North Africa. But their information is incomplete, provided by a news agency
with little interest in history or culture, and viewed in light of a political situation that considers
foreigners from the region potential terrorists. The natural assumption for those with strong
ideals but short attention spans is to lump the complex and distinct communities from Iran to
Morocco in one large, hostile group. For a population frightened of terrorists, homogeneity is
much easier to dislike and rally against. In this group consciousness, the other crystallizes and
takes the shape of all that is different, wrong, and barbaric. This extends to the renewed faith in
secular democracy, a symbol of enlightened Western society. While certain Western politicians
and media pundits view it as a cure for political upheaval or even the final stage of political
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evolution for an advanced civilization, their opponents in the Middle East and North Africa see
imperialism, disrespect, and the decline of their global independence. Many of those opponents
also view democracy as the end of the regional power, so they opt to prevent it. Using their own
media and conservative interpretations of history or religion, they encourage citizens to reject
democracy and forfeit their own political participation. Cultural politics encourages the polities
of both groups to focus on keeping the ideological enemy at bay, thus distracting them from
human rights abuses, capability limitations, and their own disenfranchisement.
These observations have led me to favor a fourth, newly emerged paradigm. Alternately
referred to as cross cultural dialog or diatopical hermeneutics, this approach necessitates a
holistic stance on human rights.

A philosophical form of pluralism, this is an open

communication that acknowledges that no system is perfect and that one’s society, values,
government, and human rights position can be improved by re-examination and conversation
with those who have differing opinions. Extreme universal and relativist arguments can be
useful because they force human rights advocates to constantly guard against superiority or
insularity.

However, in a world constantly shrinking under the pressure of transnational

corporations, immigration, war, and economic liberalization, human rights must adopt a more
pragmatic stand. The best way to accomplish this dialog is through a careful and culturally
informed examination of personal capabilities. This versatile approach allows anthropologists to
understand human rights in terms of that which people are able to do and be. By looking at
capabilities, human rights advocates can largely ignore the unproductive rhetoric that
characterizes cultural politics and work from within a culturally specific and informed base.
Among political imprisonment, torture, human trafficking, and thousands of more severe
and arguably more important human rights abuses, why focus on female genital cutting, veiling,
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and democracy? First these three ideas are more culturally tied to the communities that practice
them than many others. They have distinct histories and are born out of a context older than
Mohammed, heavily influenced by Islam, twisted by colonialism, reinterpreted as new leaders
filled the postcolonial vacuum, and now navigate cultural politics in a post 9/11 world. For this
reason, these ideas are more susceptible to international critique than more obvious human rights
infractions. There are far fewer doubts about the legitimacy of massacres than of the burqa.
And, of course, as an anthropologist, I am more interested in cultural and communal rights than
in those covered by international laws and treaties.
In this paper, I make a concerted effort to explore the cultural history that surrounds
human rights, especially the specific cases of female genital cutting, veiling, and democracy. I
believe that many of the incompatibility theories relate to a flawed understanding of history and
its reinterpretation by political elites, colonial powers, and opportunistic religious leaders. I have
discussed the regional histories at length, but it is important to note that “Western” and “nonWestern” are such broad categories that they are only useful because they are the terms used in
cultural politics. Nussbaum attributes such errors to a short memory:

We forget that modern mathematics, which played a key role in the European
Enlightenment, had its origins in Arab culture; we forget that Christianity had its
origins in a part of the world that nowadays is regarded as “non-Western”. We
forget that the roots of ideas of human equality, democracy, and human rights
existed in many different cultures and that their full development in “our own” is
a very recent matter. We forget that ideas of religious toleration and equal respect
were well known in India by the time of Ashoka’s empire, in the third century
B.C.E., a very long time before they were known in Europe (Nussbaum, 2007:7).
When discussing human rights, advocates must avoid the familiar trap of cultural politics
and recognize that their culture is dynamic and has been influenced by a vast history of
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interaction, dialog, and interpretation.

In the increasingly pluralist world, anthropological

methods are crucial to developing ideas of legitimacy and legitimizing seemingly foreign ideas.
I specifically focused on three ideas that have no easy answers, occupy a nebulous
position in international law, and have been distorted in cultural politics. Anthropologists and
social theorists have written the majority of the literature on these subjects and the most
important texts in the field are contentious and authors seldom agree with one another. In short,
it is the perfect environment for the capabilities approach. This system alone is equipped to fully
understand every viewpoint, investigate history and verify authenticity, promote legitimacy by
finding solutions that do not compromise underlying values, and above all ensure that human
capabilities are being protected. Female genital cutting, veiling, and democracy are shining
examples of both the inadequacy of current rights systems and the value of capabilities.
In any such situation where normative values break down and the way forward is unclear,
capabilities can illuminate the way forward better than rights, duties, or laws.

More

optimistically, we can understand triumphs (or perceived triumphs) in human rights through the
capabilities approach as well. Just as with potential abuses, potential successes in human rights
discourse can be problematized by cultural politics.
The capabilities approach can be easily applied to other current issues studied by
anthropologists, including elections in Iraq, the Millennium Development Goals, the growing
concern over food access in American inner cities, and gay marriage reform in the United States.
Elections are a tool by which democracy can occur, but it is not the only form of political
participation. More important is the functioning that this tool allows. Because of the sectarian
nature of Iraqi religious politics, Shari’a may be less helpful than this western form of political
input. The famous photographs of stained thumbs from women and men throughout the country
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are a testament to the fulfillment of that central capability. However, the ongoing political
destabilization that followed Iraq’s historic election has limited the functional abilities of those
voters, and so elections can no longer be said to satisfy the right to shape one’s own life.
The Millennium Development Goals center on a rights-based approach and are thus more
rigid and culturally based than the capabilities approach. Rather than seeking to improve what
people are actually able to do and be, they aim to improve the system on a state level. Their
rhetoric has the potential to benefit the areas that the UN considers to be underdeveloped, but the
tools that they use, namely neoliberal economic development, are functionally ineffective in the
lives of the people the goals hope to improve. This is especially clear in Latin America, where
neoliberal policies designed to stabilize currency and improve global confidence in those
economies has, at best, done nothing to improve the lives of millions in poverty and, at worst,
has led to the erosion of the social safety nets that mitigated this poverty in the past. By failing
to improve lives within their own cultural and historical context, this program perpetuates a
distrust of Western/Northern policy and satisfies little more than the greed of a corporate class
who benefits from the new market.
The issue of food deserts, areas in which good food is either too expensive or too difficult
for inner-city residents to seek out, relates to access, health, and equity (Winne 2008). As
grocery stores followed ‘white flight’ out of cities, they left small shops with few competitors but
because of their location, no room to expand to the retail size of their suburban counterparts. As
a result of low competition, higher food prices, and the inefficiency of shipping fresh food into
the city, prices increased but quality diminished.

Inner city supermarkets have become

inadequate for meeting the needs of low-income families. Small and poorly stocked, they offer
few fresh vegetables and even fewer nutritional options. Cheap or fast food options abound, in
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part because of the low cost and convenience. Because large supermarkets can make more
money in the suburbs than cities, most city groceries remain relatively small but the food
production system favors economies of scale. As city groceries closed or raised prices, the
resulting gap created so-called food deserts. The physical difficulty of shopping where the food
is fresh and inexpensive perpetuates food insecurity. From a capabilities perspective, people in
this situation lack the access to the same health and quality of life that their suburban
counterparts enjoy with respect to a fundamental need. Business interests and poor city planning
have denied them this opportunity and their physical health is suffering as a result. As a result of
this, their ability to take control of their lives and reach a full potential is seriously impacted.
Gay marriage is extremely relevant to capabilities and the discussion of accommodation
because of the vocal religious objections by conservative Americans.

However, allowing

homosexuals to marry does not force objectors to marry other members of the same sex.
Denying homosexuals that right does, in fact, force them to adopt a heterosexual perspective.
The issue is one of equal treatment for all citizens. A gay marriage ban denies the same rights
afforded by the state to heterosexual couples to homosexual couples, giving preferential
treatment to a majority group. Not only would such legislation limit homosexuals’ capability to
pursue love and commitment in their cultural context, it establishes the idea that one sexual
preference is correct and the other is wrong. In that world, homosexuals are second-class
citizens. If American critics remember laws against interracial marriage or early colonial laws
that forbade Jewish weddings (Nussbaum 2008), they will understand the ongoing struggle for
marital freedom.
In the age of globalization, anthropology is more relevant than it has ever been. The
capabilities approach is a universal framework for human rights, but it is utterly dependent on
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anthropological data. Because we rely so heavily on ethnography, anthropologists are uniquely
qualified to synthesize raw cultural data with broader social, political, and economic theories.
This leads to a fuller understanding of a holistic worldview and provides the understanding
necessary for a culturally specific adaption of Nussbaum’s capabilities. Previous human rights
schemes have relied either on laws based entirely in Western practice with little regard for local
tradition and blatant disregard for religious differences, or have degraded into ineffective and
ultimately self-defeating extreme cultural relativism.

The capabilities approach demands

anthropological data and requires the skills necessary to equitably mediate culturally based
interpretations of human fundamentals. Perhaps more importantly, this anthropologically based
method allows groups to speak for themselves, prove the legitimacy of their customs, show their
commitment to a greater quality of life, and improve the global community by sharing their
unique perspective. At a time when great numbers of people are rallying against human rights
abuses, anthropologists have been given an opportunity to use their skillset to facilitate equity
and dialogue throughout the world.
Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be extremely useful in dealing
with matters of torture or wrongful imprisonment, it is inadequate for more culturally based
rights and ideas. The capabilities approach provides a philosophical base from which to address
perceived abuses, but in the absence of cross cultural dialog Western human rights advocates run
the risk of misunderstanding culture as abuse. The complex historical background of the Middle
East and North Africa has led to a conflation between religion, culture, and politics in the
rhetorical battles between political elites in the East and West. To accept polarized political
discourse as the truth would ignore this convoluted past. The power of the capabilities approach
lies in its willingness to consider the different possible angles that have led to a cultural practice.
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Rather than seeking to provide immediate change, dialog forces different parties to gradually
work out their problems and urges that they fully understand a situation before attempting to
change it. Because the process is dialog and not instruction, it will force both the West and the
Middle East and North Africa to consider their shortcomings. In time, both can learn from each
other and realize that while economics and politics may divide, culture can unite.
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